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INTRODUCTION 
Administrative law has long been a quiet corner of legal scholarship. 
Debates occurred over changes at the margin: how much of a role should cost–
benefit analysis play? How could notice-and-comment rulemaking better live 
up to its promise of public engagement? How big a problem is the revolving 
door or industry capture of agency agendas? The literature excited insiders, 
but was viewed by most outsiders as technical, specialized, and, often, dry. 
No longer. For the first time in nearly a century, the scholars, judges, 
lawyers, and advocacy groups challenging the constitutional foundations of 
the modern administrative state have reached a critical mass. Detractors have 
existed since the New Deal settled the current legal framework for 
administration. But critics, while garnering attention from time to time, have 
remained largely at the fringes of scholarly, judicial, and political discourse. 
Now their critiques top the agenda of even the largest-tent conservative legal 
organization, the Federalist Society; have revivified legislative proposals that 
could dramatically change the New Deal settlement; and potentially 
command a majority on the Supreme Court. 
Legal scholars have played a central role in generating this constitutional 
critique. Until recently, the New Deal settlement governed judicial doctrine. 
Hints of the critique might crop up in an opinion by Justice Clarence Thomas 
or the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals might send up a trial balloon.1 But by 
and large, the constitutional critique of the modern administrative state 
appeared in think tank publications and the pages of law reviews.2 Its 
 
1 See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns., 531 U.S. 457, 486-87 (2001) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (questioning whether the modern nondelegation doctrine prevents all unconstitutional 
delegations of legislative power); Am. Trucking Ass’ns. v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1999) 
(finding that a provision of the Clean Air Act was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power). 
2 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV. 1387, 
1388 (1987) (arguing that “the expansive construction of the clause accepted by the New Deal 
Supreme Court is wrong . . . and that a host of other interpretations are more consistent with both 
the text and the structure of our constitutional government.”); Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the 
Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1231 (1994) (“The post-New Deal administrative state 
is unconstitutional, and its validation by the legal system amounts to nothing less than a bloodless 
constitutional revolution.”). The Cato Institute also fostered this line of critique in its Regulation 
magazine. See, e.g., Douglas H. Ginsburg, Delegation Running Riot, REGULATION, Winter 1995 at 83, 
84 (reviewing DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: HOW CONGRESS 
ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION (1993)) (“[F]or 60 years the nondelegation 
doctrine has existed only as part of the Constitution-in-exile, along with the doctrines of enumerated 
powers, unconstitutional conditions, and substantive due process . . . . The[ir] memory . . . is kept 
alive by a few scholars who labor on in the hope of a restoration . . . .”); see also RANDY E. BARNETT, 
RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 1 (2004) (“Since the 
adoption of the Constitution, courts have eliminated clause after clause that interfered with the 
exercise of government power. . . . [This] culminated in the post-New Deal Court that gutted the 
Commerce Clause and the . . . Tenth Amendment, while greatly expanding the unwritten ‘police 
power’ of the states.”). 
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architects, labeled defenders of the “Constitution in Exile,” called for a return 
to what they described as the pre–New Deal constitutional order.3 
The influence of this critique has grown rapidly in recent years. In 2005 
Jeffrey Rosen contended that the “Constitution in Exile” movement planned to 
pack the courts. Rosen described John Roberts, who President George W. Bush 
was considering for a Supreme Court appointment, as one of the movement’s 
fellow travelers.4 Roberts was soon confirmed as Chief Justice. Since then, that 
court-packing plan has advanced in leaps and bounds, so much so that these 
days, Chief Justice Roberts looks like a relative moderate on the Court.5 
Meanwhile, the substance of the critique has also evolved. Now the 
Progressive Era rather than the New Deal marks the moment the nation 
turned its back on the founding constitutional order and ushered in the 
modern administrative state.6 This shift has made the nineteenth century a 
 
3 Jeffrey Rosen, The Unregulated Offensive, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, April 17, 2005 (describing 
a “Constitution in Exile” movement”). Rosen took the name from Ginsburg, supra note 2, at 84. 
Members of the alleged “Constitution in Exile” movement strongly disputed its existence. See, e.g., 
Michael S. Greve, Liberals in Exile: Beware Their Grand Plan to Impose a Radical, European-Style 
Constitution in America, LEGAL TIMES (May 2, 2005), https://www.aei.org/publication/liberals-in-
exile [https://perma.cc/K2TV-5A98] (“[T]here is no Constitution in Exile movement”). But see The 
Constitution in Exile, THE CONSTITUTION SOCIETY, http://www.constitution.org
/cons/exile/exile.htm [https://perma.cc/U56W-3RL9] (last visited Sept. 16, 2018) (embracing the 
term as a description of a self-described libertarian movement to restore the Constitution to that 
“originally understood by the Founders”; though arguing that those principles were first abandoned 
not in the twentieth century, but in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819)). 
4 Rosen, supra note 3. 
5 For instance, Chief Justice Roberts joined the majority to uphold the Affordable Care Act in 
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012). Nonetheless he frequently joins or authors 
opinions questioning the foundations of administration and administrative law. See, e.g., Gundy v. 
United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2139 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (arguing that the nondelegation 
test the Court has used since the New Deal “has no basis in the original meaning of the Constitution, 
its history, or even the decision from which it was plucked”); Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2425 
(2019) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part) (creating a majority for the parts of an opinion preserving 
a narrowed version of judicial deference to agencies’ interpretations of their regulations but 
specifying that he did not see that decision as “touch[ing] upon” the continued viability of Chevron 
deference, according to which judges defer to agency interpretations of statutes). 
6 See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, HOW PROGRESSIVES REWROTE THE CONSTITUTION 2 
(2007) (contending that the New Deal Court’s constitutional transformation “grew out of the 
intellectual work of the Progressive Era”); PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
UNLAWFUL? 109, 228, 302, 453 (2014) (describing the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries 
as when the intellectual, judicial, legislative, and executive branch foundations of the modern 
administrative state were laid); JOSEPH POSTELL, BUREAUCRACY IN AMERICA: THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE’S CHALLENGE TO CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT 167 (2017) 
(arguing that circa 1900 “administrative law had remained relatively static for over a century” but 
that a “sea change in administrative law and American constitutionalism was on the horizon”). Cf. 
RANDY E. BARNETT, OUR REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION: SECURING THE LIBERTY AND 
SOVEREIGNTY OF WE THE PEOPLE 124 (2016) (arguing that after spending the period from the 
founding to the 1900s building a constitutional order that respected individual rights, Progressives 
led the courts to abandon that approach for one that privileged democratic majorities). That said, 
the New Deal still looms large in critiques of the modern administrative state. See Gillian E. 
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central battleground for contemporary arguments about the future of 
administration,7 and the template for scholars’ prescriptions about how to 
restore the administrative state’s constitutionality.8 
At a general level, critics who argue for a return to nineteenth-century 
administrative law emphasize several features said to characterize the period. 
First, they argue that Congress legislated with far greater specificity than it 
does today, granting agency actors little to no discretion to adopt regulations 
that bound the public.9 Second, they contend that Congress tasked courts, not 
agencies, with enforcement of the most coercive policies and de novo judicial 
review was available for agency decisions implicating what one scholar has 
 
Metzger, Foreword: 1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1, 63 (2017) 
[hereinafter Metzger, 1930s Redux] (rooting contemporary “anti-administrativisim” in rejection of 
the New Deal). A new generation of legal scholars is also critiquing administration and 
administrative law from a more functionalist than formalist or traditionalist perspective. See, e.g., 
Randy J. Kozel & Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Administrative Change, 59 UCLA L. REV. 112, 115 (2011) 
(arguing that varying judicial review when agencies change course depending on how the agency 
justified its original action “strikes an appropriate balance between the need for agency flexibility 
and the paramount importance of a stable rule of law”); Mila Sohoni, Agency Adjudication and Judicial 
Nondelegation: An Article III Canon, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1569, 1572-73, 1576 (2013) (arguing that courts 
should review agency adjudications of private rights more closely than those of public rights to 
vindicate Article III and nondelegation principles); Christopher J. Walker, Legislating in the Shadows, 
165 U. PA. L. REV. 1377, 1379-80 (2017) (suggesting that courts should rethink Chevron deference in 
light of the self-delegation concerns raised by agency involvement in drafting statutes). Note that 
recent political histories depart from the account of American history underlying critiques focused 
on a Progressive-Era turn away from constitutional foundations. See, e.g., BRIAN BALOGH, A 
GOVERNMENT OUT OF SIGHT 16-17 (2009) (arguing that the federal government played an 
important if hidden role in the lives of ordinary Americans throughout the nineteenth century, that 
the emphasis on individual rights as a check on government in the late-nineteenth century was the 
“exception rather than the rule in American governance,” and that Progressives advocated primarily 
for delegating national authority to the private sector instead of building the administrative state). 
On the extent of regulation at the local level, see WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE: 
LAW AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1996). 
7 Compare JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST 
ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 6 (2012) [hereinafter MASHAW, 
CREATING] (arguing that the constitutional foundations of the modern administrative state were laid 
during the nineteenth century), with POSTELL, supra note 6, at 167 (arguing that administrative law 
remained about the same from the Founding to 1900 and changed dramatically thereafter). 
8 See infra notes 9–13 and accompanying text. 
9 See HAMBURGER, supra note 6, at 109-10 (arguing that, on the whole, before the twentieth 
century Congress did not delegate to agencies the power to legally bind the public); POSTELL, supra 
note 6, at 74-78, 99-102, 145-53, 164 (arguing that the scope of congressional delegations to agency actors 
in the nineteenth century was narrow); Ronald A. Cass, Delegation Reconsidered: A Delegation Doctrine 
for the Modern Administrative State, 40 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 147, 151 (2017) (arguing that the 
nondelegation doctrine “should return to its historic [nineteenth-century] roots” by allowing 
delegations of discretion only for sufficiently unimportant decisions and only where those decisions 
relate to the constitutional powers of the delegee). Others focus on returning to the nineteenth-century 
scope of Congress’s enumerated powers. See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 6, at 2 (challenging the modern 
administrative state on the grounds that it departs from nineteenth-century limits on Congress’s 
Commerce Clause powers, commitments to federalism, and protection of individual liberties). 
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called the “core private rights” to life, liberty, and property.10 Agencies could 
issue final decisions only as to “public rights,” such as the distribution of public 
lands, and private “privileges,” such as a license to operate.11 Third, they argue 
that, other than during the mid-nineteenth century, federal courts reviewed 
agency action for its comportment with the law.12 Fourth, in conducting that 
review, they contend, courts gave weight to executive branch interpretations if 
they were longstanding or contemporaneous to the law’s enactment, but, they 
argue, “there was . . . no general rule . . . requiring ‘deference’ to executive 
interpretation qua executive interpretation.”13 
Throughout this literature, one premise has been assumed without being 
examined: that courts played a primary role in constitutional interpretation, 
including determining the constitutionality of agency action. For instance, 
Joseph Postell describes courts in the nineteenth century as “exercising 
authority to overturn agency action on constitutional grounds.”14 Aditya 
Bamzai describes courts’ constitutional review of the executive branch in this 
period as de novo.15 
But what if instead agencies, not the courts, took the lead in interpreting 
the Constitution during the nineteenth century? Indeed, what if courts hardly 
reviewed the constitutionality of agency action at all? What if it is, in fact, 
the modern administrative law that these critics want to restore to its 
nineteenth-century roots that has shifted responsibility for constitutional 
interpretation from agencies to courts and expanded courts’ constitutional 
review of agency action? A growing body of work on what is called 
administrative constitutionalism suggests this may very well be the case. 
I found my way to the term “administrative constitutionalism” through 
historical research. I was encountering mid-twentieth-century agency 
interpretations of the Constitution that differed notably from those of the 
 
10 See HAMBURGER, supra note 6, at 293-96 (arguing that with the exception of “military 
orders and warrants issued under suspensions of habeas” only courts, and not agencies, could issue 
legally binding decisions; instead, agency decisions would be reviewed de novo by the courts); 
POSTELL, supra note 6, at 90-92 (noting that judicial enforcement was common in the most coercive 
policy areas such as customs penalties and forfeitures and patent and copyright protection); Caleb 
Nelson, Adjudication in the Political Branches, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 559, 565 (2007) (contending that 
in the nineteenth century, with partial exceptions for tax enforcement and eminent domain, and 
categorical exceptions for the territories as well as military commissions and tribunals, Congress did 
not delegate to executive branch officers the disposition of what he terms “core private rights” to 
life, liberty, and property). 
11 Id. 
12 POSTELL, supra note 6, at 134-36. 
13 Aditya Bamzai, The Origins of Judicial Deference to Executive Interpretation, 126 YALE L.J. 
908, 965 (2017). 
14 POSTELL, supra note 6, at 168. 
15 Bamzai, supra note 13, at 964 (“There was no stark distinction drawn between de novo 
constitutional and deferential statutory interpretation.”). 
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Supreme Court and did not know what to make of them.16 Legal scholarship on 
the role Congress plays in making constitutional law gave me a way to make sense 
of that historical record. It also gave me a nomenclature: if Congress’s 
engagement with the Constitution was “legislative constitutionalism,” what I was 
finding was “administrative constitutionalism.”17 In 2010, I first used the term to 
describe agencies’ interpretation and implementation of the United States 
Constitution.18 Since then, historians who encountered the Constitution in 
agency archives have built a burgeoning literature on how agencies have 
interpreted and implemented the Constitution.19 
 
16 See generally SOPHIA Z. LEE, THE WORKPLACE CONSTITUTION FROM THE NEW DEAL 
TO THE NEW RIGHT (2014) [hereinafter LEE, WORKPLACE]; Sophia Z. Lee, Race, Sex, and 
Rulemaking: Administrative Constitutionalism and the Workplace, 1960 to the Present, 96 VA. L. REV. 
799 (2010) [hereinafter Lee, Race, Sex, and Rulemaking]. 
17 See generally Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five 
Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943 (2003). 
18 A number of legal scholars found their way simultaneously to the term and formulated 
arguments about its scope, substance, and value, enriching how I understood and viewed the practice. 
See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION 33 (2010) (using the term “administrative constitutionalism” to refer to the process by 
which legislators, executives, and administrators work out “America’s fundamental normative 
commitments,” a process that “include[s] but [is] not limited to Constitutional analysis”); MASHAW, 
CREATING, supra note 7, at vii (using the term to describe the “institutional and legal developments” 
that secured the constitutional legitimacy of the early administrative state); Gillian E. Metzger, 
Administrative Constitutionalism, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1897, 1899 (2013) (including “the statutes and legal 
requirements that create and govern the modern administrative state” in the definition of 
administrative constitutionalism); Gillian E. Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law as Constitutional 
Common Law, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 479, 485 (2010) (using administrative constitutionalism to refer to 
agencies “tak[ing] constitutional concerns seriously in their own decisionmaking” and to ordinary 
administrative law doctrines that encourage this behavior). 
19 See Gregory Ablavsky, Beyond the Indian Commerce Clause, 124 YALE L.J. 1012, 1018-19 (2015) 
[hereinafter Ablavsky, Beyond] (arguing that early American executive branch actors “gave concrete 
meaning to the Constitution’s sparse framework,” thereby establishing “federal authority over Indian 
affairs”); Kristin A. Collins, Illegitimate Borders: Jus Sanguinis Citizenship and the Legal Construction of 
Family, Race, and Nation, 123 YALE L.J. 2134, 2141-42 (2014) [hereinafter Collins, Illegitimate Borders] 
(arguing that administrators played a key role in encoding “nativist policies” into the definition of 
citizenship); Sam Erman, Citizens of Empire: Puerto Rico, Status, and Constitutional Change, 102 CALIF. 
L. REV. 1181, 1183 (2014) (arguing that administrators, not only courts, played a key role in shifting 
“the constitutional order . . . from according U.S. citizenship and robust rights to all nontribal U.S. 
people and toward acceptance of U.S. colonialism”); Jeremy Kessler, The Administrative Origins of 
Modern Civil Liberties Law, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1083, 1085 (2014) (arguing that executive branch 
officials “took the lead in forging” the modern understanding of civil liberties); Karen M. Tani, 
Administrative Equal Protection: Federalism, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Rights of the Poor, 100 
CORNELL L. REV. 825, 828-29 (2015) [hereinafter Tani, Administrative Equal Protection] (arguing 
that welfare officials developed and implemented a novel interpretation of how equal protection 
governed income assistance programs during the mid-twentieth century); see generally KAREN M. 
TANI, STATES OF DEPENDENCY: WELFARE, RIGHTS, AND AMERICAN GOVERNANCE, 1935–1972 
(2016) [hereinafter TANI, STATES OF DEPENDENCY] (recounting multiple examples of agency 
officials interpreting and implementing the Constitution). 
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Using this history, scholars of constitutional and administrative law have 
developed a rich literature on the theoretical and normative questions 
administrative constitutionalism raises. These include how public, self-
conscious, or determinative constitutional considerations have to be to count 
as administrative constitutionalism; what institutional factors foster, deter, 
and shape administrators’ engagement with the Constitution; when, if ever, 
agencies can interpret the Constitution differently than the courts; and 
whether courts should defer to agencies’ constitutional interpretations.20 
Administrative constitutionalism can be defined broadly or narrowly. 
Defined most broadly, it refers to agencies’ role in constructing constitutional 
norms such as adequate due process, the bounds of free speech, or the scope 
of executive power, whether or not agencies consider themselves to be doing 
so. More narrowly, it includes only instances in which agencies self-
consciously consider the meaning of the Constitution in designing policies 
and issuing decisions.21 
Broadly defined, it includes all instances in which agencies implement the 
Constitution, even if they do so merely as a precursor to determination of the 
constitutional question by Congress or the courts. More narrowly defined, 
 
20 See, e.g., David E. Bernstein, Antidiscrimination Laws and the Administrative State: A Skeptic’s 
Look at Administrative Constitutionalism, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1381, 1399-1400 (2019) (arguing 
that administrators have been insufficiently protective of First Amendment rights); Anjali S. Dalal, 
Shadow Administrative Constitutionalism and the Creation of Surveillance Culture, 2014 MICH. ST. L. 
REV. 59, 64 (2014) (criticizing “shadow administrative constitutionalism” whereby agency actions 
determine constitutional understandings “without the necessary public consultation, deliberation, 
and accountability”); Olatunde C. Johnson, Lawyering That Has No Name: Title VI and the Meaning 
of Private Enforcement, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1296 (2014) (arguing that effective Title VI lawyering 
requires “shaping” and “overseeing” agency implementation of this constitutionally congruent 
statute); Metzger, Administrative Constitutionalism, supra note 18, at 1901 (“justify[ing] administrative 
efforts to move the nation beyond recognized constitutional requirements to develop new 
constitutional understandings”); Joy Milligan, Subsidizing Segregation, 104 VA. L. REV. 847, 850 
(2018) (arguing that “agency design plays an under-appreciated role in shaping administrators’ 
interpretations of the Constitution”); Bertrall L. Ross II, Embracing Administrative Constitutionalism, 
95 B.U. L. REV. 519, 522 (2015) (praising how “agencies’ constitution-based value 
judgments . . . become part of our broader constitutional framework and value system”); Adrian 
Vermeule, Deference and Due Process, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1890, 1893 (2016) (calling for judicial 
deference to “reasonable agency decisions about the design of procedural arrangements”). For my 
engagement with these questions, see Sophia Z. Lee, From the History to the Theory of Administrative 
Constitutionalism, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW FROM THE INSIDE OUT: ESSAYS ON THEMES IN THE 
WORK OF JERRY L. MASHAW 109-33 (Nicholas R. Parrillo ed., 2017). The subject has even crossed 
borders. See Matthew Lewans, Administrative Constitutionalism and the Unity of Public Law, 55 
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 515, 518-19 (2018) (arguing that Canadian courts “should respect 
administrative decisions concerning constitutional matters”). 
21 As described further below, while there is abundant evidence of the broader type of 
administrative constitutionalism in the nineteenth century, historians are just beginning the archival 
excavations necessary to determine the scope of the narrower type. As I indicate infra notes 53–56, 
65, 72–76, 121–131, 136 and accompanying text, the evidence available thus far suggests the latter type 
was prevalent as well. 
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administrative constitutionalism encompasses only those instances in which 
an agency has the final say or interprets the Constitution in a way that sets it 
against the courts or Congress.22 
However defined, this Article argues that historians’ case studies of 
administrative constitutionalism suggest that administrative agencies have 
been the primary interpreters and implementers of the federal Constitution 
throughout the history of the United States, although the scale and scope of 
administrative constitutionalism has changed significantly over time as the 
balance of opportunities and constraints has shifted.23 That said, the Article 
also contends that over the twentieth century, and especially since the New 
Deal, courts have cast an increasingly long shadow over the administered 
Constitution. In part, this is because of the well-known expansion of judicial 
review during this period. But the shift has as much to do with changes in 
the legal profession, legal theory, and lawyers’ roles in agency administration. 
The result is that administrative constitutionalism may still be the most 
frequent form of constitutional governance, but it has grown, paradoxically, 
more suspect even as it has also become far more dependent on and 
deferential to judicial interpretations.24 
 
22 Again, while there is evidence of the broader type, see infra notes 67–71, 111–120, and 138–
139 and accompanying text, extant historical work also indicates examples of the narrower type of 
administrative constitutionalism. See infra notes 34–37, 42–48, 53, 57–66, 101–105, 121–131 and 
accompanying text. 
23 To be fair, I am stating my claim in its strongest possible form and a number of factors might 
weaken it. For one, I mean primary in a numerical sense. But comparing the number of 
constitutional questions decided by agencies versus courts or Congress may not be the best measure. 
Even if Congress or the courts made fewer constitutional decisions, those they made might have 
been more consequential. Further, even if a numerical comparison is compelling, I am basing my 
comparison on conjecture from a few scattered case studies and sources that may prove 
unrepresentative. Also, only some of those sources involve agencies explicitly referencing the 
constitutional import of their decision; in others there is no way to know if the agency was knowingly 
making a constitutional decision. Thus, much more research is required to quantify how often 
agencies consciously versus de facto decided constitutional questions and the significance of the 
constitutional decisions they made. Further complicating things, making explicit invocation of the 
Constitution the measure of administrative constitutionalism may be ahistoric given scholars’ view 
that constitutionalism drew from multiple sources and was far less text-bound in the early American 
period. See, e.g., Gregory Ablavsky, Administrative Constitutionalism in the Northwest Territories, 167 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1631, 1637 (2019) [hereinafter Ablavsky, Administrative Constitutionalism] (noting “the 
eclecticism of sources that had long characterized early American constitutionalism”). I have 
highlighted below evidence that suggests my claim is plausible, but hope others will assess it with 
the sort of original research that is beyond the scope of this Article. 
24 Writing the history of administrative constitutionalism is a synthetic task that depends on 
and benefits from the resurgence of political history and the proliferating historical work on 
administrative constitutionalism. Any definitive account is far in the future. But beginning the 
project now offers a scaffold for later case studies to lean on, augment, and dismantle. It is a history, 
in other words, worth building as we go. 
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The history of administrative constitutionalism offered here is likely to 
trouble those who seek to restore administrative law to its nineteenth-century 
foundations (whom I will call “foundationalists”).25 They are unlikely to find 
appealing a nineteenth century in which agencies took the lead in deciding 
constitutional questions, subject to some oversight by Congress and the 
President, but virtually none by the courts. These critics hold out 
constitutional law as uniquely important: that law is what powers their 
arguments that the United States should turn back the clock. And they prefer 
nineteenth-century agencies because they depict them as exercising little 
consequential legal power.26 But this history suggests that those agencies had 
the first and often final word on the Constitution’s meaning. Foundationalists 
also assume that reinstating the nineteenth-century constitutional order 
would empower courts to more closely scrutinize agency action.27 The history 
presented here instead suggests that it would all but eliminate judicial review 
of those actions’ constitutionality. Indeed, the burgeoning history of 
administrative constitutionalism indicates that anyone who wants to ensure 
that courts review the constitutionality of agency action has to appeal to 
theories that are rooted in constitutional evolution, not origins, and in 
twentieth—not nineteenth—century administrative law and judicial practice. 
Of course, it is also possible that scholars who seek a return to nineteenth-
century administrative law would not be troubled by the history presented 
here. In their account, agencies in the nineteenth century determined public 
rights and private privileges only, while the Constitution guaranteed judicial 
resolution of core private rights.28 If judicial resolution of core private rights 
was ensured, that would also ensure judicial determination of any 
constitutional issues raised. And if judicial resolution of public rights and 
private privileges was unnecessary, foundationalists might argue, so was any 
judicial determination of the constitutional issues their adjudication involved. 
A full response is beyond the scope of this Article, but here, briefly, are several 
reasons I think foundationalists would be wrong to be unconcerned by the 
account that follows. 
Even assuming that foundationalists’ account of the distribution of agency 
and judicial authority in the nineteenth century is correct, they should still 
 
25 I mean foundationalist in its historic and doctrinal rather than philosophical sense. Further, 
my prediction about foundationalists admittedly involves speculation since none of them have 
addressed administrative constitutionalism. But given their following assumptions and assertions, I 
think the prediction is warranted. 
26 See supra note 9. 
27 Metzger, 1930s Redux, supra note 6, at 38 (observing that today’s critics of the administrative 
state look to judicial rather than presidential oversight as the antidote); see also supra notes 10-13 and 
accompanying text. 
28 See supra notes 10–11. 
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be troubled by the history presented here for two reasons. First, the history 
that follows reveals an important exception to the availability of de novo 
judicial review of agency action implicating core private rights. As 
foundationalists recognize, such judicial review could be barred if a court 
found that the federal agent had acted within his legal authority.29 As I 
explain further below, the evidence thus far suggests that, in making those 
determinations, courts rarely if ever considered constitutional limits on the 
agent’s authority until the beginnings of modern administrative law at the 
close of the nineteenth century.30 That means that even for core private rights, 
courts were not providing de novo judicial review of agency action that 
exceeded constitutional, as contrasted to statutory, limits on agency authority. 
This would seem to create a concerning loophole for those who contend that 
returning to nineteenth-century administrative law would ensure judicial 
resolution of all core private rights. 
Second, foundationalists may in fact be concerned by administrative 
constitutionalism even when it involves the adjudication of public rights and 
privileges. For instance, foundationalists’ arguments rely on a particular 
delineation of legislative, executive, and judicial powers. In cases that 
foundationalists would categorize as public rights cases, nineteenth-century 
agency actors determined constitutional issues, including the extent of 
executive power,31 agencies’ inherent power to issue rules and regulations,32 
and the scope of the President’s treaty power.33 The fact and substance of this 
administrative constitutionalism should concern foundationalists because it 
may require them to revise how they delineate and distinguish legislative, 
executive, and judicial powers. As these examples suggest, the history 
presented here also highlights the important constitutional issues that can 
arise in the adjudication of public rights and private privileges. Were 
foundationalists to succeed in restoring nineteenth-century administrative 
law, they would leave resolution of these important constitutional issues 
exclusively to agencies. But are they really comfortable, say, relegating the 
First Amendment rights of broadcast licensees to agencies to decide? 
 
29 See, e.g., HAMBURGER, supra note 6, at 294-95 and discussion infra notes 42–43 and 
accompanying text. 
30 See infra notes 42–48 and 94–120 and accompanying text. 
31 See, e.g., No. Pac. R.R., 19 Pub. Lands Dec. 87, 88-90 (1894) (rejecting the Secretary of 
Interior’s claim to inherent executive authority to withdraw public lands from sale to use for other 
public purposes). 
32 Hessong, 9 Pub. Lands Dec. 353, 359 (1889) (finding that the Secretary of Interior “had the 
right to prescribe rules and regulations for the proper disposition of the Osage lands, by virtue of 
the general powers of the Executive under the constitution”) (internal quotations omitted)). 
33 Herriott, 10 Pub. Lands Dec. 513, 518 (1890) (reasoning that the President’s treaty power 
and his inherent authority permitted him to reserve lands even absent statutory authorization). 
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But foundationalists’ description of the nineteenth century as a time when 
agency adjudication of core private rights was subject to de novo judicial 
review may not be accurate in ways that should also make foundationalists 
concerned about the history of administrative constitutionalism. First, there 
may well have been agency adjudications of core private rights during the 
nineteenth century that were not subject to de novo judicial review. The 
historical work to determine with any certainty whether agencies finally 
adjudicated private rights has yet to occur and is especially unclear for the 
nation’s first decades.34 To the extent that agencies actually adjudicated rights 
that foundationalists care a lot about, such as vested property rights, then 
those scholars should also care about how agencies used the Constitution in 
determining those rights and how courts supervised agencies’ use of the 
Constitution in those cases. 
Second, foundationalists’ account of the nineteenth century relies on 
distinguishing away practices in the federal territories, where they 
acknowledge their model did not pertain. There, during the nation’s 
Founding era and beyond, there was no de novo judicial review of agency 
adjudications implicating core private rights because even the courts were 
staffed by executive branch—or at least not judicial branch—officials.35 But 
 
34 For instance, how the Land Office and its precursors (for simplicity’s sake, collectively 
referred to herein as “the Land Office”) are categorized is central to these jurisdictional claims. 
Foundationalists argue that Land Office officials determined only whether someone was due a 
benefit of public land. HAMBURGER, supra note 6, at 196-97; Nelson, supra note 10, at 578. Gregory 
Ablavsky, however, has done extensive research in the Land Office records and observes that its 
officers primarily determined title that predated the United States’ assumption of sovereignty rather 
than gave away unclaimed public land. Gregory Ablavsky, The Rise of Federal Title, 106 CALIF. L. 
REV. 631, 658 (2018). In other words, the Land Office appears to have adjudicated vested rights. 
Foundationalists might respond that, even if the Land Office was adjudicating vested rights, 
any third party with a claim of a prior vested interest in the property at issue could go to court to 
challenge the office’s land patent once it had issued, preserving de novo judicial review. 
HAMBURGER, supra note 6, at 196-97; Nelson, supra note 10, at 578. They may be right, but (1) this 
would not have helped a party with a vested interest who was denied a patent by the Land Office, 
and (2) their supporting evidence leaves decades of early practice unaccounted for. Nelson supports 
his claim with two Supreme Court cases decided about a century after the nation’s founding, which 
themselves cite cases dating back to only 1820. Nelson, supra note 10, at 578 n.75 (citing Smelting 
Co. v. Kemp, 104 U.S. 636, 641-42 (1881) and Litchfield v. Register, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 575, 578 (1870)). 
Further, the judicial review described in the cases Nelson cites is cabined in multiple ways. See 
Smelting Co., 104 U.S. at 647-48. Hamburger cites Nelson, an 1858 letter from the Interior Secretary, 
and possibly (its precise relevance is unclear) an 1859 opinion by the Attorney General. 
HAMBURGER, supra note 6 at 561 n.13. I would welcome more extensive research into the workings 
of the land offices and courts from the Founding forward to ascertain with more precision when 
unsuccessful patent claimants and third-parties were and were not able to use courts to vindicate 
their property rights claims. 
35 See Ablavsky, Administrative Constitutionalism, supra note 23, at 1633 n.12 (observing that 
determining the status of territorial judges is complicated but that the evidence suggests they were 
understood to be officers of the United States, or at least not part of the Article III judiciary); see 
also Gary Lawson, Territorial Governments and the Limits of Formalism, 78 CAL. L. REV. 853, 891-93 
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the territories were where much if not most federal administration occurred 
before 1900.36 This raises a question of descriptive accuracy: how persuasive 
is it to describe de novo judicial determination as the rule during a period 
when most federal agency adjudications impacting core private rights, such 
as vested property rights, were determined without de novo review by a 
member of the judicial branch? Because the exception arguably swallows the 
rule, perhaps the rule should be rejected, or at least the exception better 
incorporated into the rule.37 And if the rule is changed to accommodate 
executive—or at least non-judicial—branch determination of vested property 
rights, then concern about how the Constitution governed those 
determinations should follow. 
The remainder of the Article is devoted to developing the history of 
administrative constitutionalism from the Founding to the present day. I 
return briefly to the implications of this history for critics of the modern 
administrative state in the Conclusion. 
I. THE CONSTITUTION’S ADMINISTRATIVE FOUNDATIONS, 1776–1900 
For administrative constitutionalism, the long nineteenth century was one 
mainly of opportunities rather than constraints. The relative prevalence of 
administrative constitutionalism was a constant during this period. The Civil 
War, however, marked an important shift in the scale, scope, and practice of 
administrative constitutionalism, as the opportunities for its practice far 
outpaced the constraints it faced. 
A. Administering the Constitution Before the Civil War 
The U.S. Constitution framed but hardly resolved burning questions 
about the new nation. One need look no further than the Federalists and Anti-
Federalists to see deep disputes over the division of power between the state 
and federal governments. Arguments about whether the 1798 Sedition Act 
 
(1990) (critiquing Am. Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828), for holding 
territorial courts were not Article III courts); Nelson, supra note 10, at 575 (contending that 
territorial judges exercised judicial power but recognizing that the Supreme Court did not treat 
them as Article III courts). On the total absence of Article III courts’ appellate or primary 
jurisdiction during the Founding era, see James Pfander, Article I Tribunals, Article III Courts, and the 
Judicial Power of the United States, 118 HARV. L. REV. 643, 707 (2004). It was not until 1805 that 
Congress gave the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over territorial courts. Id. at 712 n.308. 
36 Indeed, this is the central argument of Brian Balogh’s comprehensive and synthetic history 
of administration in this period. BALOGH, supra note 6, at 11. 
37 See Ablavsky, Administrative Constitutionalism, supra note 23, at 1635 (“As for the suggestion 
that the territories were a minor exception to ‘normal’ structures of constitutional governance, this 
assertion, dubiously descriptive of the present, is particularly inapposite for the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries.”). 
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violated the First Amendment’s guarantees of freedom of speech and the 
press demonstrate that the implications of the Constitution’s rights 
provisions were no more settled than was its structural architecture.38 
Scholars who study this period, including the above disputes, have 
recognized that the courts did not have much to say on many of the 
constitutional questions of the day.39 While the Supreme Court began 
reviewing the constitutionality of federal laws in the mid-1790s, it only 
decided 62 such cases before the Civil War, more than half of them after 1830, 
and most “regarding the institution of the Judiciary itself or the boundary 
between the state and federal governments.”40 
As for reviewing the acts of government officials as they went about the 
business of administering the territories, collecting customs, and delivering 
the mails, courts did not, as a general matter, weigh in on the constitutionality 
of their actions.41 For the most part, affected individuals were limited to 
 
38 Indeed, whether the Constitution was “deeply indeterminate, by necessity and design” or a 
“textual artifact . . . whose content was defined by the language in which it was written” was itself 
an unsettled question. JONATHAN GEINAPP, THE SECOND CREATION: FIXING THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION IN THE FOUNDING ERA 10 (2018). 
39 Cf. Farah Peterson, Interpretation as Statecraft: Chancellor Kent and the Collaborative Era of 
American Statutory Interpretation, 77 MD. L. REV. 712, 716 (2018) (“In a sense, federal courts [of the 
1790s–1820s] were not even ‘courts’ . . . . Their jurisdiction was tiny, and what jurisdiction they had 
was so freighted with non-legal pressure that their decisions provide little helpful data for 
understanding the development of statutory interpretation as a legal, rather than diplomatic, 
activity.”); Christopher Beauchamp, Repealing Patents, 72 VAND. L. REV. 647, 665-66 (2019) 
(observing that in the early American period, particularly though not exclusively in the context of 
invention patents, federal courts served roles we would consider today more administrative than 
judicial). 
40 Keith E. Whittington, Judicial Review of Congress Before the Civil War, 97 GEO. L.J. 1257, 1267 
(2009). The pace of review did not reach one case per year until the 1820s or exceed that until after the 
1840s. Id. at 1268. In the lower courts, there were few cases in the first two decades of the nation’s 
history and at most on average one every other year until the 1830s when the frequency climbed, 
reaching a peak average of two a year in the 1840s. Id. at 1268-69. As Whittington notes, this probably 
undercounts the number of actual cases due to spotty reporting of decisions. Id. at 1268. Scholars debate 
when and how the Supreme Court came to exercise the power of what we today call “judicial review,” 
or the power to declare acts of Congress unconstitutional. See generally LARRY D. KRAMER, THE 
PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); WILLIAM 
E. NELSON, MARBURY V. MADISON: THE ORIGINS AND LEGACY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (Peter 
Charles Hoffer & N. E. H. Hull eds., 2000); Mary Sarah Bilder, The Corporate Origins of Judicial Review, 
116 YALE L.J. 502 (2006); Daniel J. Hulsebosch, A Discrete and Cosmopolitan Minority: The Loyalists, the 
Atlantic World, and the Origins of Judicial Review, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 825 (2006); William Michael 
Treanor, Judicial Review Before Marbury, 58 STAN. L. REV. 455 (2005); Whittington, supra. 
41 Judicial review of the constitutionality of agency action in this period has received almost no 
scholarly attention. The closest scholars have gotten to the subject is touching on it incidentally to 
examining judicial review of agency action generally. See, e.g., MASHAW, CREATING, supra note 7, at 
139, 210, 216-18 (describing the general structure of judicial review of agency action before the Civil 
War and noting that courts were not even inclined to “insure that the administrative process gave 
private parties a fair hearing on their claims”); Jerry L. Mashaw, Reluctant Nationalists: Federal 
Administration and Administrative Law in the Republican Era, 1801–1829, 116 YALE L.J. 1636, 1689-90 
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bringing ordinary common law claims against federal officials in their 
personal capacities.42 Statutory authority to act was an absolute defense. 
Constitutional questions could arise in these actions. First, the 
constitutionality of a statute asserted in defense could be raised, but in those 
cases it was the constitutionality of an act of Congress, not the agency, that 
was being reviewed.43 Second, conceivably, a plaintiff might contend that an 
act taken pursuant to a constitutional statute was nonetheless carried out in 
an unconstitutional manner. Any such cases would be examples of 
constitutional review of a federal agency actor.44 The existing literature does 
not provide evidence of this type of review and determining whether such 
cases exist is beyond the scope of this Article. My preliminary exploration of 
published opinions that raised due process issues in common law actions 
against federal agents, however, did not identify a single case in the federal 
 
(2007) [hereinafter Mashaw, Reluctant Nationalists] (noting absence of due process challenges to agency 
actors’ summary seizures and review thereof under the Embargo Act); Ann Woolhandler, Judicial 
Deference to Administrative Action—A Revisionist History, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 197, 202-04, 211-12, 218-19 
(1991) (describing the general structure for pre-Civil War judicial review of agency action and noting 
that courts lacked concern about the adequacy of agency process and considered constitutional duties 
only indirectly, insofar as they might be reflected in common law actions). The scholar to have given 
the question of constitutional review of agency action its most sustained (though still fleeting) 
treatment finds that it occurred little to never during this period. MASHAW, CREATING, supra note 
7, at 217.  
42 While there are shadings to the accounts of general judicial review of agency action, they 
agree that the main way such review occurred before the Civil War was in common law actions against 
government officers in their personal capacity. MASHAW, CREATING, supra note 7, at 139, 210, 216-17; 
Nicholas Bagley, The Puzzling Presumption of Reviewability, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1299 (2014); 
Frederic P. Lee, Origins of Judicial Control of Federal Executive Action, 36 GEO. L.J. 287, 295 (1948) 
[hereinafter Lee, Origins of Judicial Control]; Mashaw, Reluctant Nationalists, supra note 41, at 1688; 
Woolhandler, supra note 41, at 202-04, 206-10, 212. Before the Civil War, these cases proceeded mainly 
in state courts, with appellate review to the U.S. Supreme Court. Pfander, supra note 35, at 730. 
43 Cf. Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 280 (1856) 
(finding that a statute authorizing the Secretary of Treasury to issue a distress warrant against the 
property of a customs collector, and thereby subject it to sale by a marshal, did not violate due 
process). 
44 Some common law causes of action incorporated elements that mimicked constitutional 
provisions. For instance, lack of probable cause was an element of the tort of malicious prosecution. 
A fruitful inquiry would be to examine how, in such cases, courts handled an officer’s absolute 
defense of legal authorization. Perhaps courts used proof of the constitutionally resonant element 
of the tort to also establish that the officer had carried out his statutorily authorized duties in excess 
of his constitutional authority. If so, at least in those cases, arguably judicial review of the 
constitutionality of agency action occurred. Cf. Merriam v. Mitchell, 13 Me. 439, 453 (1836) 
(suggesting, in a part of the report that may be conveying the judge’s reasoning, that the probable 
cause element of the malicious prosecution tort furthers Fourth Amendment purposes). For more 
on Merriam, see James E. Pfander, Suits Against Officeholders, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO 
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 361-63 (Karen Orren & John W. Compton eds., 2018). 
Thank you to Jim Pfander for pointing this case, and possibility, out to me. 
 
2019] Our Administered Constitution 1713 
courts and state supreme courts during this period.45 A search to identify 
constitutional challenges to customs seizures yielded no results.46 
 
45 I conducted an exploratory and merely suggestive search of Westlaw’s database of state 
supreme court, federal district and appellate court, and U.S. Supreme Court decisions in the 
antebellum period for any cases using the term “due process” but excluding cases with the term 
“criminal.” I chose due process because it was a constitutional claim likely to show up across multiple 
agencies and because it seemed to be used as an umbrella for unconstitutionality such that a 
proceeding that was otherwise constitutionally inadequate might be argued to also fail to provide due 
process. See, e.g., Hodgson v. Millward, 3 Grant 406, 409-10 (Pa. 1863) (finding that seizing property 
without a warrant violated the Fourth Amendment and interpreting the statute that authorized the 
seizure to implicitly require that it occur “by due process of law”). While my search revealed no due 
process cases, it did turn up one 1816 case that might have involved constitutional review of a federal 
agent. Jacobs v. Levering, 2 D.C. (2 Cranch) 117, 117 (1816) (finding, in a one-sentence resolution of 
an action for trespass categorized by Westlaw as a war powers case but itself silent as to the basis for 
its holding, that a General’s order to the militia to impress horses did not justify their impressment). 
There was also one 1852 state case that involved a due process analysis but reviewed an act of a 
territorial legislature. Swan v. Williams, 2 Mich. 427, 442-43 (1852) (finding territorial act of 
incorporation that authorized the resulting railroad company to exercise powers of eminent domain 
over private property without notice to owners did not violate the Northwest Ordinance or the U.S. 
Constitution). Cf. Webster v. Reid, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 437, 459-60 (1850) (holding territorial statute 
violated the Seventh Amendment because it denied a jury trial before deprivation of property and 
declaring nullities trials in which notice to parties (provided as required by the statute) was 
inadequate); Reed v. Wright, 2 Greene 15 (Iowa 1849) (holding territorial statute “unconstitutional” 
because it denied landowners judicial process before depriving them of their land but using the term 
to refer to a violation of the Northwest Ordinance not the U.S. Constitution). How to conceive of 
territorial legislatures—as exercising executive or legislative power; as being purely federal creatures 
or exercising independent sovereignty akin to states—is unresolved, to say the least. See Puerto Rico 
v. Sanchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. 1863, 1878 (2016) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that Puerto Rico’s laws 
had previously been treated as the product of an independent sovereign but also suggesting this was 
peculiar to that territory); Gary Lawson, Territorial Governments and the Limits of Formalism, 78 CALIF. 
L. REV. 853, 900-05 (1990) (arguing that territorial legislatures fail to conform with the structural 
Constitution whether understood as exercising legislative or executive powers). Note, however, that 
even if the territorial legislatures are understood as executive branch actors, the cases reviewing their 
work share the structure of the more common cases in which the constitutionality of an act of 
Congress was at issue and not of an agency actor. 
46 I searched all cases in Westlaw during this period for those with the terms “constitution,” 
“seizure,” “certificate,” and “customs.” Customs officers faced with suit in their personal capacity could 
petition a federal district court for a certificate of probable cause that would provide immunity from 
the private action. Customs seizures are held up in the literature as the paramount example of common 
law challenges to administrative action. The search did not turn up any such challenges involving 
constitutional issues. See also GAUTHAM RAO, NATIONAL DUTIES: CUSTOM HOUSES AND THE 
MAKING OF THE AMERICAN STATE 152-54 (2016) (discussing key legal challenges to customs 
enforcement in the early republic, none of which involved judicial determination of constitutional 
questions). Note that my searches are merely suggestive not only due to any imperfections in the search 
parameters but also because they only capture published opinions for a period during which most cases 
were unpublished. Research into whether unpublished state and federal cases involving common law 
suits against federal agents raised constitutional issues would be most welcome. Providing a further 
suggestive check, as far as I’ve been able to ascertain, none of the sources cited supra notes 41–42 describe 
a case involving constitutional review of a federal officer’s actions. 
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The other, albeit rarely applied, type of review was through a writ of 
mandamus.47 Because that was available only for discretionless acts required 
by Congress, however, the constitutionality of the administrative action was 
unlikely to arise there either. Instead, in the rare instances when 
constitutional issues arose in actions against federal agency actors, the 
Supreme Court focused on structural constitutional questions and its review 
was more concerned with the scope of the courts’, President’s, or Congress’s 
power than the constitutionality of administrative action.48 
This has led to the conclusion that the Constitution governed during the 
Founding and early republic as much or even primarily through the 
interpretations of the President or Congress.49 But for every congressional 
debate over the constitutionality of the Sedition Act,50 or presidential 
 
47 For the unavailability of mandamus review of federal officers before the Civil War, see James 
E. Pfander & Jacob P. Wentzel, The Common Law Origins of Ex Parte Young, 72 STAN. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 24-26) (on file with author). That changed with Kendall v. United 
States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 609-10 (1838) (holding that under the Constitution’s separation of 
powers, Congress can command and courts can enforce through a writ of mandamus an executive 
branch officer’s performance of a purely ministerial act). The door Kendall opened was effectively 
closed soon after by Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. (5 Cranch) 497, 515 (1840) (narrowly defining when 
acts were sufficiently ministerial to be eligible for a writ of mandamus). See also infra note 94 and 
accompanying text. 
48 See, e.g., Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236, 245 (1845) (holding that under the 
Constitution’s design, except for “enumerated instances,” the judicial branch could only hear those 
cases authorized by statute such that Congress could constitutionally bar assumpsit actions against 
custom collectors); Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 179 (1804) (holding that an executive 
order authorizing capture of American vessels sailing from France could not bar the captor’s liability 
for damages where Congress had enacted a law authorizing capture only of those vessels bound for 
France, and dismissing the argument that the claim for damages would properly lie against the 
government). See also Kendall v. United States, supra note 47. Cf. Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 
Cranch) 110, 128-29 (1814) (holding, in an action brought by a U.S. Attorney for forfeiture of enemy 
property, that the forfeiture could not be authorized by the President’s war powers alone). For a 
caution against overreading the power Cary v. Curtis found Congress had to limit federal courts’ 
jurisdiction, see Kristin Collins, Social Movements, Legal Elites, and the Transformation of Article 
III, at 18-19 (2019) (draft manuscript) (on file with author). For an argument that Chief Justice John 
Marshall sought to create some degree of military officer immunity in Little v. Barreme despite its 
holding on presidential power, see Jane Manners, Executive Power, Officer Indemnity, and A 
Government of Laws, Not of Men: A Re-Reading of The Charming Betsy and Little v. Barreme 16-17 
(2019) (draft manuscript) (on file with author). 
49 As an illustration, the chapters in H. Jefferson Powell’s history of the Constitution do 
not focus exclusively or even predominantly on the Supreme Court until after the Civil War. H. 
JEFFERSON POWELL, A COMMUNITY BUILT ON WORDS: THE CONSTITUTION IN HISTORY 
AND POLITICS (2002). See also GEINAPP, supra note 38, at 13 (describing Congress as the 
“principal site of constitutional development and transformation” in the 1790s). For Congress’s 
constitutionalism during the antebellum period, see David P. Currie’s multivolume work THE 
CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS. For a history of the gradual expansion of federal courts’ 
jurisdiction during the nation’s first decades, see Alison LaCroix, Federalists, Federalism, and 
Federal Jurisdiction, 30 L. & HIST. REV. 205, 236-40 (2012). 
50 Marc Lendler, “Equally Proper at All Times and at All Times Necessary”: Civility, Bad Tendency, 
and the Sedition Act, 24 J. OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC 419 (2004). 
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message on federal authority over the states,51 there were many more 
instances of ordinary administrators, from Secretaries of State down to local 
customs collectors, who decided what the Constitution meant in practice.52 
Until recently, their contributions to creating constitutional meaning were 
overlooked. Thanks to recent scholarship, however, a new account of the 
Constitution during the United States’ first decades is coming into view and 
it is one in which administrators took the lead. Further, due to limited 
oversight from Congress or the President and next to none from the courts, 
agencies provided not only the first, but often the last or only word on 
constitutional questions. 
Historians have shown that Congress left key questions of constitutional 
structure and rights to agencies to determine, and that agencies self-
consciously undertook answering them. Gregory Ablavsky, in his article in 
this issue, describes how administrators worked out the scope of military 
versus civilian jurisdiction in the territories—a question they understood to 
be of constitutional import—without clarification from Congress.53 
Elsewhere, Ablavsky has written about how Congress’s expansive grant of 
discretion to the executive branch to govern Indian affairs left that branch to 
give “concrete meaning to the Constitution’s sparse framework . . . .”54 These 
officials understood their task to involve constitutional interpretation, as 
reflected in the words of Washington’s Secretary of War, who asserted that 
the federal government had, “under the [C]onstitution, the sole regulation of 
 
51 Gregory Ablavsky, The Savage Constitution, 63 DUKE L.J. 999 (2014) [hereinafter Ablavsky, 
Savage Constitution]. 
52 As noted supra note 23, I state my claim in its strongest possible form in the hopes that doing 
so will inspire others to assess it with the sort of original research that is beyond the scope of an 
article that synthesizes existing scholarship. 
53 Ablavsky, Administrative Constitutionalism, supra note 23, at 1649-51. The battle over military 
versus civil jurisdiction in the territories, Ablavsky notes, was “among the earliest discussions of 
some of the most fundamental constitutional questions in U.S. history.” Id. at 1638. 
54 Ablavsky, Beyond, supra note 19, at 1019. 
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Indian affairs, in all matters whatsoever.”55 The Postmasters General also 
directed subordinates on the scope of First Amendment protections.56 
In an era when courts did not review agency action for its comportment 
with due process,57 if Congress did not set adjudicatory procedures, 
administrators were left to determine what sufficed. Federal regulation of 
steamboat boiler safety in the antebellum period fits this model.58 As Jerry 
Mashaw describes, Congress gave the local boards the authority to hold 
hearings and swear witnesses but did not prescribe any procedures.59 Instead, 
the local boards “filled the gap based on custom and notions of fundamental 
fairness” with procedures that included ample notice and opportunity to put 
on a defense or introduce mitigating circumstances.60 An important subject 
of further study is whether officials designing adjudicatory procedures during 
this period understood the Due Process Clause to be relevant to their 
decisions. As is discussed below, there is evidence from the late-nineteenth 
century that agencies considered the constitutionality of their procedures.61 
 
55 Id. at 1042. As all three branches embraced during the mid-nineteenth century a conception 
of executive power over Natives that did not derive from and was not limited by constitutional power 
or subject to judicial review, agencies were freed to operate without need to consider constitutional 
limits on their actions. See Maggie Blackhawk, Federal Indian Law as Paradigm Within Public Law, 
132 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1829 (2019) [hereinafter Blackhawk, Federal Indian Law] (observing that 
United States v. Rogers developed a doctrine of executive power over Indian Country that was “wholly 
separate from and not limited by the Constitution”); Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in 
Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign 
Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1, 46-47 (2002) (explaining that United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567 
(1846), grounded Congress’s authority over Indian tribes in an extraconstitutional doctrine of 
discovery that precluded judicial review of its exercise). A question for further research is whether 
administrators exercising these plenary powers considered constitutional limits on their actions 
despite the Supreme Court saying they did not have to. 
56 See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 37-51, at 4-5, 8 (1863) (reproducing, among others, transmission of 
the Postmaster General from August 22, 1835 expressing his view that it was constitutional for the 
New York Postmaster to refuse to forward abolitionist newspapers to states that barred them and 
concluding that the constitutionality of excluding from the mails “newspapers and other printed 
matter, decided by postal officers to be insurrectionary, or treasonable, or in any degree inciting to 
treason or insurrection” was established by the Post Office’s subsequent “course of precedents . . . 
known to Congress, [and] not annulled or restrained by act of Congress”). For debates over postal 
policy regarding abolitionist newspapers, see RICHARD J. JOHN, SPREADING THE NEWS: THE 
AMERICAN POSTAL SYSTEM FROM FRANKLIN TO MORSE ch. 7 (1995). 
57 Woolhandler, supra note 41, at 211. 
58 For a groundbreaking argument that Congress created this and other nineteenth-century 
agencies to implement the public’s constitutional right to petition, see Maggie McKinley, Petitioning 
and the Making of the Administrative State, 127 YALE L.J. 1538, 1546-47, 1597-1600 (2018), arguing that 
petitioning pursuant to the Petition Clause shaped the development of administrative agencies from 
the First through the Eightieth Congress, including the regulation of steamboats. 
59 MASHAW, CREATING, supra note 7, at 204. 
60 Id. at 199-200. But cf. POSTELL, supra note 6, at 102 (arguing that the local boards’ 
adjudicatory power was less significant than Mashaw suggests). 
61 See infra notes 121–122 and accompanying text. 
 
2019] Our Administered Constitution 1717 
Even when Congress sought to exert control over administration by 
legislating in great detail, administrators still filled in important, 
constitutionally relevant gaps. As Mashaw describes, the Republican-era 
Congress sought to control federal administration through ever more detailed 
statutes. But as his treatment of the Land Office shows, “[s]tatutory 
specificity simply was not up to the job of instructing officials in the field.”62 
This included determining the constitutionally required process land 
claimants were due. Unlike the steamboat example above, here Congress 
spelled out a number of procedural details for the hearings it authorized. Yet, 
“federal legislation left a substantial number of questions to be resolved by 
administrative rule or practice.”63 These included details currently 
understood as part of due process’s bundle of procedural sticks such as 
whether witness testimony could be in writing or legal representation would 
be allowed.64 As Kevin Arlyck has shown, the Secretary of Treasury added 
procedural protections and what Arlyck argues was leniency grounded in the 
Eighth Amendment to the civil forfeiture remissions the Secretary decided.65 
Further, as early as the 1810s, Congress shifted away from trying to control 
administration via detailed statutory prescriptions and toward granting 
broader delegations and performing greater ex post investigation and 
oversight.66 As a result, the cabined procedural discretion of the Land Office 
gave way to the more expansive administration of due process seen in the 
steamboat example above. 
Congress and the courts, when they weighed in on constitutional 
questions during this period, often codified answers worked out in the first 
instance by administrators. For example, the 1790 Indian Trade and 
Intercourse Act, which left the executive branch with such broad discretion 
to determine federal control of Indian affairs, was itself drafted by the 
administration and enacted by Congress with little debate.67 When the 
Supreme Court first addressed Indian affairs in the 1830s, it adopted the view 
of federal power worked out by the executive branch.68 While Mashaw does 
not discuss constitutional questions specifically, he notes that by the 
Jacksonian period, Congress increasingly recognized “that the knowledge 
 
62 MASHAW, CREATING, supra note 7, at 126. 
63 Id. at 132. 
64 Id. 
65 Kevin Arlyck, The Founders’ Forfeiture, 119 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript 
at 55-59) (on file with author). If Arlyck is right that Eighth Amendment concerns informed the 
Secretary’s leniency, his implementation of this constitutional limit far exceeded that of the courts: 
Arlyck found that whereas the Secretary granted ninety-one percent of remission petitions, the 
government prevailed eighty-nine percent of the time in court. Id. at 37. 
66 MASHAW, CREATING, supra note 7, at 135. 
67 Ablavsky, Beyond, supra note 19, at 1043-44. 
68 Id. at 1044-45 (discussing Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832)). 
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necessary for effective policy making now resided with the administrators of 
the various governmental departments.”69 Legislators sought administrators’ 
input before legislating regarding patents and reorganizing or creating 
agencies.70 While further work is needed to be certain, it seems likely that the 
pattern seen in the 1790 Act held for other legislation that touched on 
constitutional questions.71 
Presidential oversight of administration was also so limited as to make the 
administrators’ constitutionalism theirs and not his. Presidential input 
varied. Ablavsky’s work on the Washington administration’s position on 
Indian affairs lies on the more involved end of the spectrum. Ablavsky 
observes that “[t]he most pressing issue for early Americans was federalism: 
would the states or the national government possess authority over Indian 
relations?”72 Ablavsky notes that George Washington adopted the view that, 
under the Constitution, “the United States . . . possess[es] the only authority 
of regulating an intercourse with [the Indians], and redressing their 
grievances.”73 Washington charged his Secretary of War with implementing 
that authority.74 But as Ablavsky observes, the Secretary “was only the most 
vociferous member of an administration committed to federal supremacy 
over Indian relations,” including administrators who otherwise leaned toward 
states’ rights.75 They all understood this to be a matter of constitutional 
construction, explicitly referencing the Constitution in their debates.76 
Outside of the period’s most pressing issues, the President’s influence over 
the administrative resolution of constitutional questions was even weaker. As 
Ablavsky describes in his article in this issue, the President never responded 
regarding the constitutional questions roiling the territories.77 Mashaw 
similarly describes presidential “involvement, indeed micromanagement” as 
the exception not the rule before the Civil War.78 Even during the Jacksonian 
period, when presidentialism strengthened, Mashaw remarks, the growing 
“scale and complexity of administration tended to reduce political control by 
 
69 MASHAW, CREATING, supra note 7, at 220-21. 
70 Id.; see also, POSTELL, supra note 6, at 102 (“Legislators agreed that agencies’ input should 
be sought to ensure that new laws are guided by their experience . . . .”). 
71 This is especially so given the later evidence that even as to constitutional issues, Congress 
followed rather than led administrators. See infra note 138 and accompanying text. 
72 Ablavsky, Beyond, supra note 19, at 1019. 
73 Id. at 1041 (alterations in original) (quoting Letter from George Washington to Thomas 
Mifflin (Sept. 4, 1790), in 6 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON: PRESIDENTIAL SERIES 396 
(Mark A. Mastromarino ed., 1996). 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 1042. 
76 Id. 
77 Ablavsky, Administrative Constitutionalism, supra note 23, at 1644, 1648. 
78 MASHAW, CREATING, supra note 7, at 141. 
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both the President and Congress even as both busily reasserted its 
necessity.”79 
Thus, by the Civil War, emerging scholarship suggests that many 
constitutional questions were resolved in the first, and often in the last or 
only, instance by administrators.80 Further, in many cases, the evidence shows 
these administrators doing so self-consciously and explicitly. 
B. Administrative Constitutionalism During Reconstruction and the Gilded Age 
Administration expanded notably after the Civil War. There were 
glimmerings of more robust judicial review of administration but little actual 
changes. Meanwhile, congressional and presidential involvement remained 
scant. As a result, the growth in administration meant that, if anything, 
administrators’ primacy in constitutional interpretation and implementation 
increased during the last decades of the nineteenth century. 
Civil War, Reconstruction, and industrialization were among the many 
forces that multiplied administration, and its opportunities for 
constitutionalism, in the late-nineteenth century. As is well known, the Civil 
War generated a massive increase in the administration of war pensions. 
There were half a million cases by 1890, a load that nearly doubled by 1900.81 
Congress also added a number of new agencies. The war led to the formation 
of the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands (Freedmen’s 
Bureau). In addition, Congress added departments of agriculture, labor, 
justice, and education. It created the Interstate Commerce Commission as 
well, long identified as the harbinger of the modern administrative state.82 
 
79 Id. at 220. 
80 Note that one should not adopt an overly rosy picture of the practice of administrative 
constitutionalism in the nineteenth century, as histories of the governance of Natives make clear. 
See, e.g., STEPHEN J. ROCKWELL, INDIAN AFFAIRS AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE IN THE 
NINETEENTH CENTURY 3, 8 (2010) (describing westward expansion as forging “a vibrant, 
complicated federal bureaucracy, planning and performing complex and difficult tasks in politically 
charged environments” that ultimately “removed, contained, and dispossessed American Indians and 
tribes” nationwide); Blackhawk, Federal Indian Law, supra note 55, at 1823 (describing the military 
violence and coerced removal that resulted from “unfettered executive power” over relations with 
Native peoples). The point is not that the nineteenth-century experience proves the normative 
desirability of administrative constitutionalism in general or in every particular instance, but that 
the period does not provide a usable past for checking the constitutionality of agency action through 
the courts or centralizing in those courts the task of constitutional interpretation. 
81 MASHAW, CREATING, supra note 7, at 257. 
82 See, e.g., THOMAS K. MCCRAW, PROPHETS OF REGULATION: CHARLES FRANCIS 
ADAMS, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, JAMES M. LANDIS, ALFRED E. KAHN 61-62 (1984) (observing that 
“[m]ost of the later federal commissions were patterned on the Interstate Commerce Commission”). 
But see POSTELL, supra note 6, at 164 (arguing that the Commission was more akin to nineteenth-
century administration than that of the twentieth century). 
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During this period, Congress included multiple constitutionally resonant 
charges to agencies in its statutes, delegating to them the work of 
interpretation and implementation. As Karen Tani describes in her article in 
this issue, the Freedmen’s Bureau implemented the Constitution’s newest 
amendment, generating the first interpretations of “involuntary servitude.”83 
Others have described how Freedmen’s Bureau officials enforced “equal 
protection of the laws” as well as the First Amendment.84 The Comstock Act 
of 1873 empowered the Post Office to exclude obscene materials from the 
mail, putting it in charge of deciding what speech to allow and what to 
censor.85 Congress also directed the Interstate Commerce Commission to 
disallow “discrimination” in rail travel, a task that could also require 
determining the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.86 Relatedly, with 
the expansion of the United States’ imperial ambitions, old statutory 
language governing the citizenship status of children born to American 
citizens abroad became newly relevant. As Kristin Collins has argued, 
administrators played a key role in determining which children could qualify 
for the American citizenship the statute authorized.87 
Agencies remained relatively free of congressional direction as they 
implemented these constitutionally resonant provisions or filled in 
constitutionally sensitive statutory gaps. As Mashaw argues, during the Gilded 
Age, administrative authority was “poorly circumscribed by either statutory 
 
83 Karen M. Tani, Administrative Constitutionalism at the “Borders of Belonging”: Drawing on 
History to Expand the Archive and Change the Lens, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 1603, 1611 (2019); see also AMY 
DRU STANLEY, FROM BONDAGE TO CONTRACT: WAGE LABOR, MARRIAGE, AND THE MARKET 
IN THE AGE OF SLAVE EMANCIPATION 35-39 (1998) (discussing how Freedmen’s Bureau officials 
created, rather than merely implemented, the meaning of free labor). 
84 ROBERT J. KACZOROWSKI, THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION: THE FEDERAL 
COURTS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, AND CIVIL RIGHTS, 1866–1876, at 31-32, 200-01 nn.23-24 (2005). 
85 Comstock Act, ch. 258, 17 Stat. 598 (Mar. 3, 1873). Because the Comstock Act authorized 
criminal prosecutions, courts could examine the constitutionality of post officers’ determinations 
but the courts adopted such a broad construction of obscenity that administrators were largely the 
actors setting its bounds. See DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS, 1870–
1920, at 24 (1997) (“[J]udicial decisions developed an expansive interpretation and provided postal 
officials with virtually unreviewable discretion to censor publications as ‘obscene.’”). For an example 
of how judicial deference gave administrators broad ambit to determine the scope of First 
Amendment protections in the early-twentieth century, see Reuel E. Schiller, Free Speech and 
Expertise: Administrative Censorship and the Birth of the Modern First Amendment, 86 VA. L. REV. 1 
(2000) [hereinafter Schiller, Free Speech and Expertise]. Even before the Civil War, the Post Office 
had been playing a similar role through its determinations of mailability. MASHAW, CREATING, 
supra note 7, at 268-69. 
86 Cf. Statement of the Case, Winfield F. Cozart v. S. Ry. Co., at 7, 9, ICC No. 1718, 16 I.C.C. 
226 (1909) (arguing that the railway’s failure to provide black passengers with first class 
accommodations equivalent to those provided to white passengers abridged the “privileges and 
rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment” in addition to violating the Interstate Commerce 
Act) (thank you to Barbara Welke for sharing this source with me). 
87 Collins, Illegitimate Borders, supra note 19, at 2140-41. 
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specificity or congressional budgetary controls.”88 Instead, even when Congress 
enacted detailed statutes, “critical questions remained for administrative 
determination.”89 Elsewhere, Congress “ceded virtual carte blanche to the 
implementing authorities to develop substantive policy.”90 As administration 
grew, Congress’s silence on questions of agency procedure continued to leave 
administrators in charge of determining what process was due. 
The presidency was, if anything, a weaker check on administrative 
constitutionalism in the postbellum than in the antebellum period. Even as 
civil service reforms wrenched government office-giving from local 
politicians and partisans, it still left the President far from controlling the 
ever-growing federal bureaucracy.91 The series of weak presidents who 
followed Lincoln’s assassination only expanded administrators’ freedom.92 
Electoral instability, with divided government and partisan switches in power 
from election to election further ensured that the President, in the words of 
Steven Skowronek, “had never risen far above the status of a clerk.”93 
Judicial review remained a weak check on administration, including the 
constitutional questions it raised. During the last decades of the 1800s, courts 
increased somewhat the opportunities for judicial review. In 1880, the 
Supreme Court for the first time in 42 years found an executive function 
ministerial and thus eligible for a writ of mandamus.94 Subsequent cases, 
however, continued to prohibit mandamus whenever the executive action 
involved an exercise of discretion or judgment.95 The Supreme Court also 
made common law actions against officers in their personal capacity easier by 
 
88 MASHAW, CREATING, supra note 7, at 233. 
89 Id. at 242. 
90 Id. at 244. 
91 See MASHAW, CREATING, supra note 7, at 239 (“Presidents won some victories concerning 
the maintenance of their removal powers and could reduce congressional and local influence with 
each new batch of federal government employees covered into the civil service system by executive 
order. But this is a far cry from having effective control over the federal bureaucracy.”); POSTELL, 
supra note 6, at 136-45 (describing the Pendleton Act as only modestly effective at ending the spoils 
system); STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OF 
NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES 49 (1982) (“In 1871, the civilian payroll of the federal 
government supported a mere 53,000 employees; by 1901, it had increased fivefold to 256,000.”). 
92 MASHAW, CREATING, supra note 7, at 239 (“Presidential power was at a low ebb from 
Lincoln’s assassination to the inauguration of Theodore Roosevelt”). 
93 SKOWRONEK, supra note 91, at 169. 
94 See United States v. Schurz, 102 U.S. 378, 396-97 (1880) (finding ministerial and thus 
enforceable by mandamus the act of delivering a land patent that was already duly signed, sealed, 
countersigned, recorded, transmitted, and received); Lee, Origins of Judicial Control, supra note 42, at 
295 (“After the Kendall case in 1838 it was forty-two years (1880) before the Supreme Court held 
another executive function to be ministerial.”). 
95 See, e.g., Carrick v. Lamar, 116 U.S. 423, 426 (1886) (“It is settled by many decisions of this 
court, that in matters which require judgment and consideration to be exercised by an executive 
officer of the government, or which are dependent upon his discretion, no rule for a mandamus to 
control his action will issue.”). 
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narrowing when officers were determined to be acting within their 
jurisdiction and thus protected from suit.96 Equitable review of agency action 
was initially subject to similar limits as writs of mandamus.97 But access to it 
also expanded during the 1870s.98 Yet, the space opened for judicial review of 
agency action during this period remained very narrow. For instance, the 
Court did not hold that Congress could grant a direct appeal of agency 
determinations to the federal courts until 1899.99 And judicial authority to 
review mistakes of law remained limited into the early-twentieth century.100 
 
96 Woolhandler, supra note 41, at 219-220, 233. But see Bagley, supra note 42, at 1300 (arguing 
that “by midcentury the norms of mandamus review had seeped over into most damages actions”). 
97 Bagley, supra note 42, at 1298; Lee, Origins of Judicial Control, supra note 42 at 296; Jerry L. 
Mashaw, Rethinking Judicial Review of Administrative Action: A Nineteenth Century Perspective, 32 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2241, 2247 (2011) [hereinafter Mashaw, Rethinking Judicial Review]; Henry P. 
Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 16 (1983). 
98 See Johnson v. Towsley, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 72, 83-84 (1871) (finding that, even when the 
decision of a “tribunal, within the scope of its authority, is conclusive upon all others. . . . there has 
always existed in the courts of equity the power in certain classes of cases to inquire into and correct 
mistakes, injustice, and wrong in both judicial and executive action . . . when it invades private 
rights . . . .”); POSTELL, supra note 6, at 133-35 (observing that Towsley “marked a departure from 
the Taney Court’s attempt to remove administrative determinations from review in federal court”); 
see also Bamzai, supra note 13, at 955-56 (describing how, while courts had interpreted some earlier 
statutes to grant equitable review of specific types of administrative action, the creation of federal 
question jurisdiction in 1875 made such review more widely available); Thomas W. Merrill, Article 
III, Agency Adjudication, and the Origins of the Appellate Review Model of Administrative Law, 111 
COLUM. L. REV. 939, 949 (2011) (same). Cf. LaCroix, supra note 50, at 236-40 (2012) (describing 
how the Marshall Court laid the basis for the constitutionality of federal courts’ statutorily granted 
“arising under” jurisdiction in the first decades of the nineteenth century). Daniel Ernst argues that 
by the “end of the nineteenth century, judges used injunctions to have the last word on a host of 
regulatory matters.” DANIEL R. ERNST, TOCQUEVILLE’S NIGHTMARE: THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
STATE EMERGES IN AMERICA, 1900–1940, at 37 (2014). 
99 United States v. Duell, 172 U.S. 576, 589 (1899) (rejecting separation of powers challenge to 
statute that provided for direct appeal to the federal courts of Commissioner of Patent 
determinations in interference actions); see also Mashaw, Rethinking Judicial Review, supra note 97, at 
2250 (describing the Supreme Court in Duell as “relenting” in its rejection of direct appeals of agency 
actions to federal courts). 
100 For most of the nineteenth century, there was no mandamus or equitable review for agency 
mistakes of law. MASHAW, CREATING, supra note 7, at 246-49, 274-75; Lee, Origins of Judicial Control, 
supra note 42 at 296; Monaghan, supra note 97, at 16-17. See, e.g., Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. (14 
Pet.) 497, 497 (1840) (finding that the Court could only give its judgment on an administrator’s 
construction of a law in a case within its jurisdiction and that a mandamus action challenging an 
administrator’s exercise of discretion and judgment was not such a case). Mistakes of law were only 
reviewable if Congress clearly provided for judicial review of agency action. Woolhandler, supra note 
41, at 225-26. In the 1870s, however, courts began reviewing mistakes of law even in land cases, where 
review had traditionally been most limited, when the facts were uncontested. Id. at 220, 233, 241. Cf. 
Bamzai, supra note 13, at 944-47 (collecting examples of courts setting aside executive branch 
construction of statutes and including cases from 1870s and later only). The Supreme Court did not 
make judicial review of agency mistakes of law a general principle until 1902. MASHAW, CREATING, 
supra note 7, at 248-49 (discussing Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94, 109-11 (1902)). 
 
2019] Our Administered Constitution 1723 
When it came to the constitutionality of agency action, review was rare.101 
Indeed, Thomas Cooley, in his 1868 constitutional law treatise, observed that 
“[g]reat deference has been paid in all cases to the action of the executive 
departments, where . . . it is to be presumed [] they have . . . endeavored to 
keep within the letter and the spirit of the Constitution.”102 Instead, the Court 
remained disinterested if not hostile to constitutional challenges to 
administrative action. The Court deemed the factual basis of Post Office 
mailability determinations “essentially unreviewable.”103 Mashaw describes 
the Court as seeming “exasperated by due process claims,” quoting an opinion 
in which the Court as late as 1904 insisted that “due process of law does not 
necessarily require the interference of the judicial power.”104 
An exploratory search of Westlaw for state supreme and federal court due 
process decisions during this period supports the conclusion that judicial 
review of agency actors was new, expanded gradually, and did not become 
firmly established until the nineteenth century’s close.105 
 
101 Tellingly, the Court’s well-known and oft-cited early forays during this period into 
enforcing constitutional rights did not involve review of agency proceedings but of criminal or quasi-
criminal enforcement cases in the federal courts. They also focused largely or exclusively on the 
constitutionality of the statutes being enforced rather than on the acts of the government agents. 
See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 632-34, 638 (1886) (finding that the statute that authorized 
a court’s order that an importer was required to produce an invoice in a civil forfeiture action was 
essentially criminal and violated the Fourth and Fifth Amendments such that the district attorney’s 
subsequent notice of the order and review of the invoice were also unconstitutional); Ex Parte Jackson, 
96 U.S. 727, 737 (1878) (finding constitutional, on a petition for habeas review of a criminal 
conviction, the statute that the petitioner was charged under, which excluded certain materials from 
the mails and made violation of the act a crime). 
102 THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH 
REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE AMERICAN UNION 69 (1868). 
103 MASHAW, CREATING, supra note 7, at 274. Indeed, the Court upheld Congress’s power to 
exclude some materials from the mails without expressing any concern about the First Amendment 
implications. Id. at 270 (describing Ex Parte Jackson). On the judiciary’s similar lack of concern about 
the federal government’s exercise of its tax powers, see AJAY K. MEHROTRA, MAKING THE 
MODERN AMERICAN FISCAL STATE: LAW, POLITICS, AND THE RISE OF PROGRESSIVE 
TAXATION, 1877–1929, at 56-59 (2013) (describing how treatises in the nineteenth century 
recognized the courts’ “general deference toward Congress’s taxing powers” such that those powers 
were nearly plenary and appeals of tariff appraisals had to be made to the Department of Treasury). 
104 MASHAW, CREATING, supra note 7, at 249 (quoting Pub. Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 
U.S. 497, 508-09 (1904)); see also id. at 274 (“[T]he Supreme Court was unreceptive to claims that 
due process required judicial process before the Post Office could intercept someone’s mail.”). Cf. 
THOMAS M. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES AS SEEN IN THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN LAW: A COURSE OF LECTURES BEFORE THE POLITICAL 
SCIENCE ASSOCIATION OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN 230-32 (1890) (noting the Justices’ 
failure to define the meaning of due process in the Fourteenth Amendment). The Court’s resistance 
to due process challenges may reflect Amalia Kessler’s discovery that due process was not understood 
to entail an adversarial process (as opposed to the kind of inquisitorial processes common before 
agencies) until after the Civil War. AMALIA KESSLER, INVENTING AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM: 
THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN ADVERSARIAL LEGAL CULTURE, 1800-1877, at 316-19 (2017). 
105 See supra note 45 for a description and explanation of the search parameters. 
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As before the Civil War, parties challenged the constitutionality of the 
statutes federal agency actors implemented.106 Such challenges arose in suits 
against federal agents in their personal capacity (one before 1880,107 and three 
during the 1880s and 1890s108), in four suits where the government was a 
party,109 and in one between private parties.110 
Now, however, as many state or federal cases involved judicial review of 
the constitutionality of agency actions (as opposed to the work of Congress), 
though only one of them occurred before 1880 and most were clustered in the 
1890s. Four cases involved actions at law or equity against federal agents in 
their personal capacity; one was produced by the exigencies of the Civil 
War,111 one arose in the 1880s,112 and the rest in the 1890s.113 There were nearly 
 
106 See supra notes 40, 43, 48, and accompanying text. 
107 Pullan v. Kinsinger, 20 F. Cas. 44, 45, 48, 50 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1870) (rejecting due process, 
takings, and separation of powers challenges to tax statute that prohibited suits to enjoin the assessment 
or collection of that tax and thus refusing to enjoin tax official defendants from collecting taxes owed 
under the statute). Cf. Lee v. Kaufman, 15 F. Cas 204, 207-08 (C.C.E.D. Va. 1879) (rejecting federal 
officers’ proffered jury instruction because their proposed interpretation of the statute under which the 
plaintiff ’s land was sold in a tax sale would unconstitutionally deprive plaintiff of due process and 
amount to an ex post facto penal rule); Mason v. Rollins, 16 F. Cas. 1061, 1063 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1869) 
(refusing to enjoin tax officials from enforcing a law that the plaintiff claimed violated due process 
when the plaintiff had not yet engaged in the business activity subject to the tax). 
108 See Parsons v. Dist. of Columbia, 170 U.S. 45, 51-52, 56 (1898) (finding that special 
assessment statute did not violate due process either by failing to provide adequate notice of the 
assessment or because of the powers it conferred on commissioners); Craighill v. Lambert, 168 U.S. 
611, 614 (1898) (upholding the constitutionality of a statute authorizing a federal commission to 
assess local residents for the costs of building a public park in the District of Columbia); Hilton v. 
Merritt, 110 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1884) (constructing customs statute to bar judicial review of 
appraisements and finding that the statute, so constructed, did not deny due process). 
109 See Parsons, 170 U.S. at 45; Passavant v. United States, 148 U.S. 214, 222 (1893) (finding no 
due process violation where statute did not allow judicial review of appraisal and provided for 
adequate procedures); Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586, 594 (1880) (rejecting defense to 
ejection action by the United States because there was no due process problem with a statute that 
denied the right to judicial adjudication prior to seizure of property for unpaid taxes); Allman v. 
Dist. of Columbia, 3 App. D.C. 8, 23 (1894) (finding act authorizing improvement assessment failed 
to require the notice due process demands). 
110 See Orchard v. Alexander, 157 U.S. 372, 383 (1895) (upholding power of Secretary of Interior 
to review local land officers’ determinations of preemption and stating that due process can be 
satisfied by an agency hearing and does not require “that the hearing must be in the courts”). 
111 See Hodgson v. Millward, 3 Grant 406, 409-10 (Pa. 1863) (finding that seizing property 
without a warrant violated the Fourth Amendment and did not constitute the requisite “due process 
of law”). Cf. Bailey v. N.Y. Cent. R.R., 89 U.S. (1 Wall.) 604, 638 (1874) (rejecting claim that tax 
assessment had not comported with statutorily required procedures where any error was harmless). 
112 See United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 218 (1882) (case consolidated with Kaufman v. Lee, a 
suit against federal agents) (finding, in ejection action brought by Robert E. Lee’s estate, that a tax 
sale of the estate’s lands to the United States was unconstitutionally “without any process of law and 
without any compensation”). 
113 See Noble v. Union River, 147 U.S. 165, 171-72 (1893) (finding that the Secretary of Interior 
violated due process in revoking an already issued land title); Scranton v. Wheeler, 57 F. 803, 809 
(6th Cir. 1893) (holding that there was no due process or takings violation because the challenged 
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as many cases (one in 1884,114 and three in the 1890s115) in which the 
government itself was a party and wherein courts reviewed the 
constitutionality of actions taken by the government’s agents.116 During the 
1880s and 1890s, the constitutionality of federal agents’ actions was also raised 
in two suits between private parties.117 
When the Court expanded constitutional review of agency action in the 
1880s and 1890s, it reflected innovation in judicial review, not administration. 
First, these cases involved the oldest forms of government activity: land and 
invention patents, taxes and takings.118 Second, whereas plaintiffs largely 
 
federal improvement project did not take or invade plaintiff ’s property). Cf. Brown v. Hitchcock, 
173 U.S. 473, 478 (1899) (affirming lack of court jurisdiction to review a Secretary of Interior decision 
regarding designation of lands as swampland until title had issued but suggesting in dicta that court 
review might be available if there was evidence of a due process violation). 
114 See United States v. Lawton, 110 U.S. 146, 148 (1884) (affirming due process violation where 
tax commissioners sold rather than returned land seized in excess of taxes owed). 
115 See Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U.S. 282, 306 (1893) (finding that it was consonant with 
due process to preclude judicial review of commissioners’ assessment of the value of land for 
purposes of exercising eminent domain); Allman, 3 App. D.C. at 23 (finding tax commissioners 
provided inadequate notice prior to their assessment of taxes on landowners for improvements); 
Jones v. Dist. of Columbia, 3 App. D.C. 26, 30 (1894) (same). Cf. Lem Moon Sing v. United States, 
158 U.S. 538, 550 (1895) (rejecting due process challenge where statute precluded habeas review). 
116 Notably, two of these cases dealt with taxes assessed in the District of Columbia for 
improvements, which the court treated as akin to review of a state or local tax. 
117 See McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co. v. C. Aultman & Co., 169 U.S. 606, 609, 612 (1898) 
(finding that only a court can invalidate an already issued invention patent and that it would violate 
due process to allow a patent officer to do so); Gilmore v. Sapp, 100 Ill. 297, 303 (1881) (holding that 
Congress could not delegate to land commissioner, and commissioner could not exercise, the power 
to cancel an already issued patent because that authority vested only in the judiciary). Cf. Hanford 
v. Davies, 163 U.S. 273, 279-80 (1896) (affirming dismissal of dispute over land title for want of a 
federal question where the due process claim against the territorial probate court was too vaguely 
pled and untimely raised). 
118 As in the period before the Civil War, there were also several cases that involved 
constitutional review of the work of territorial legislatures. See Mason v. Messenger & May, 17 Iowa 
261, 271-72 (1864) (holding Constitution’s due process provision does not require territorial 
legislature’s act allowing partition sales to provide for personal service on all property owners); 
Winfield v. Ott, 54 P. 714, 715 (Okla. 1898) (upholding, in action by bank depositor against bank 
director, territorial statute creating strict liability for bank officers who accepted deposits when they 
knew or should have known the bank was insolvent or failing); Guthrie Nat. Bank v. McElhinney, 47 
P. 1062, 1063 (Okla. 1897) (finding a territorial statute establishing a commission to transfer debts of 
voluntary associations that preceded an incorporated municipality to that municipality failed to 
provide due process prior to transfer of debt); Jenkins v. Ballentyne, 30 P. 760, 760 (Utah 1892) 
(finding constitutional, in an action between private individuals, a territorial ordinance authorizing 
killing by any person of unregistered and tagged dogs). Cf. Cottrel v. Union Pac. Ry., 21 P. 416, 417 
(Idaho 1889) (striking down a territorial statute that created a strict liability regime to compensate 
owners for livestock killed by trains without mentioning due process or the Constitution but later 
categorized by Westlaw as a due process case). On the difficulties with classifying these cases as 
judicial review of agency action, see supra note 45. There were also two cases that involved 
constitutional review of agency actors in employment disputes involving former government agents. 
See United States ex rel. Wedderbum v. Bliss, 12 App. D.C. 485, 492-93 (1898) (dismissing due process 
challenge by patent agent excluded from working before the Department of Interior); Cameron v. 
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failed in their challenges to the statutes agency actors implemented,119 they 
often succeeded when challenging administrators’ actions.120 Nonetheless, 
innovative as these cases were, there were only ten of them. 
Agencies, meanwhile, seem to have been actively engaged with the 
Constitution. If and how agencies considered the Constitution in carrying 
out their duties has yet to be systematically examined. A cursory search of 
agency decisions available in Westlaw and HeinOnline indicates agencies 
were hearing and deciding constitutional questions with some regularity, at 
least during the 1880s and 1890s.121 Indeed, my search turned up about as 
many due process decisions by the Land Office alone in those decades as cases 
involving due process review of any agency actor in all state supreme and 
federal courts.122 Other issues decided by agencies included the President’s 
 
Parker, 38 P. 14, 29 (Okla. 1894) (finding no property right in territorial government office and no 
basis for judicial review of territorial governor’s decision to remove plaintiff from office). 
119 Only one case among those involving the constitutionality of a statute the government had 
implemented, Allman v. Dist. of Columbia, found a due process violation (and that involved an act 
authorizing improvements for the District of Columbia, which the court treated much like a state 
or local tax). See supra notes 106–110. 
120 Courts found merit to the constitutional claims in eight of the ten cases that involved review 
of agency actors. See supra notes 111–117. Note that this suggests that the growth of horizontal judicial 
supremacy took hold earlier than Barry Friedman and Erin Delaney catch in their article, which 
dates it to 1895 at the earliest. Barry Friedman & Erin F. Delaney, Becoming Supreme: The Federal 
Foundation of Judicial Supremacy, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1137, 1142, 1167, 1169 (2011). 
121 Westlaw would not provide information on the database parameters that would allow any 
conclusions to be drawn about whether the density of claims in these decades is due to the years their 
databases cover or to agencies not considering these issues much before then. I also cannot tell whether 
the preponderance of Land Office decisions is an artifact of the database’s holdings or because the Land 
Office actually was more engaged with the Constitution than other agencies. HeinOnline does specify 
the documents in its database and they reflect a seemingly random and sparse assortment of agencies 
and time periods that seem driven by the happenstance of an agency having published a report and 
HeinOnline including it. Note that the Land Office began publishing its decisions in 1881, suggesting 
that earlier examples may well reside in its earlier unpublished records. 
122 Tibergheim, 6 Pub. Lands Dec. 483, 483-84 (1888) (finding no deprivation of property 
without due process of law and holding that a preponderance of the evidence standard is adequate 
evidentiary standard); Dayton, 8 Pub. Lands Dec. 248, 251 (1889) (on review) (finding Lyman 
Dayton had received due process of law before Department canceled his homestead entry); Bone, 8 
Pub. Lands Dec. 452, 454-56 (1889) (finding lack of notice to someone who was party of interest 
under statute fell short of due process); Hessong, supra note 32, at 359 (finding adequate notice 
given); Ary, 13 Pub. Lands Dec. 506, 506 (1891) (on review) (overruling motion where it was 
determined that all questions raised, including deprivation of property without due process of law 
claim, had been “duly considered and passed upon” in prior decisions by the department); Aylen, 21 
Pub. Lands Dec. 565, 571 (1895) (finding no deprivation without due process of law based on findings 
regarding right to scrip and that, if such error “be admitted for the sake of argument” in prior 
decisions, it “is now cured by the present proceeding”); Guerten, 23 Pub. Lands Dec. 479, 479 (1896) 
(finding due process requires granting motion for hearing to Guerten); Hayden, 27 Pub. Lands Dec. 
455, 457-58 (1898) (remanding for hearing upon review of due process challenge). 
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appointment,123 general,124 treaty,125 Take Care Clause,126 and inherent 
powers;127 the Supremacy Clause’s effect;128 the nature of Congress’s contract 
and legislative powers;129 the limits imposed by the Ex Post Facto Clause and 
the Fourth Amendment’s search and seizure protections;130 and the impact of 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause on agencies.131 In other words, even without 
entering the archives where the vast majority of agency records are held, it 
appears that agencies were deliberating on a wide range of structural and 
rights provisions, often with little or no guidance from the courts. 
If agencies’ attention to procedure is any indication, they imposed 
constraints on their authority with even greater consistency and elaboration 
than during the antebellum period, suggesting that an administered 
Constitution was not a meaningless one. Administration was professionalized 
during the late-nineteenth century and officials extended internal hierarchical 
controls to ensure greater consistency.132 As Mashaw catalogues, the result 
was an ever more standardized and elaborate set of agency procedures from 
the Land to the Pension to the Post Office. For instance, Mashaw argues that 
the process for pension adjudications during this period looked similar to the 
 
123 Foster’s Case, Decisions of the Comptroller General of the United States at 445, 450-51 (Comp. 
Gen. 1883) (finding, based on the President’s appointment powers, that the President could 
require a diplomat to remain in the United States but that the diplomat was not due compensation 
for that period). 
124 Hessong, supra note 32. 
125 Herriott, supra note 33. 
126 Tucker, 13 Pub. Lands Dec. 628, 630-31 (1891) (relying on Take Care and Supremacy clauses 
to determine that the President had the authority to create the Zuni reservation). 
127 No. Pac. R.R., supra note 31; Herriott, supra note 33. 
128 Keyes, 14 Pub. Lands Dec. 529, 531 (1892) (relying on Supremacy Clause to reject claim 
based on a Dakota statute); Tucker, supra note 126. 
129 Railway Compensation Case, Decisions of the Comptroller General of the United States at 188, 
199-201 (Comp. Gen. 1883) (reasoning that because the Contract Clause does not expressly limit 
Congress’s power to pass laws impairing contracts, Supreme Court decisions prohibiting Congress 
from changing the compensation structure of charter-contracts of bond-subsidized companies must 
rely on a “‘constitutional limitation’ inherent in legislative power”). 
130 Harrison, 4 Pub. Lands Dec. 179, 180 (1885) (ex post facto); Detection-Appropriation Case, 
Decisions of the Comptroller General of the United States at 73-74 (Comp. Gen. 1883) (search and seizure). 
131 Carriere, 17 Pub. Lands Dec. 73, 76 (1893) (interpreting the Full Faith and Credit Clause to 
apply in executive agencies as the Supreme Court has ruled that it applies in the courts); Alrio, 5 
Pub. Lands Dec. 158, 161 (1886) (same). 
132 See MASHAW, CREATING, supra note 7, at 231 (describing the shift in the civil service 
toward greater meritocracy and specialization in the post-war period). On professionalization’s 
connection to regularization of procedure, see id. at 256, describing how, at the Land Office, 
“regularization of procedural and substantive adjudicatory norms often went hand in hand with the 
specialization and professionalization of administrative offices.” But see NICHOLAS R. PARRILLO, 
AGAINST THE PROFIT MOTIVE: THE SALARY REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, 1780–
1940, at 39-40 (2013) (arguing that the rise of salaried public servants was accompanied by an increase 
in their exercise of discretion). 
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Social Security Administration’s disability determinations today.133 
Meanwhile, the Post Office’s fraud order hearings, while not quite matching 
the independence of proceedings overseen by modern administrative law 
judges, nonetheless were designed to create independence by decision-makers 
and to use an inquisitorial approach in which government was not an 
adversary but an ostensibly disinterested factfinder.134 During this period, 
agencies also began publishing their adjudicative decisions.135 There is 
evidence to suggest that these efforts were animated by constitutional 
concerns. As Joseph Postell has observed, when Thomas Cooley assumed the 
first chairmanship of the Interstate Commerce Commission, he insisted that 
agency and not judicial procedures were all that due process demanded. But 
he “sought to compensate for diminished judicial review by establishing 
thorough procedures for ICC determinations, going well beyond what was 
required by statute.”136 Further, while agencies often rejected constitutional 
challenges, they also sometimes vindicated them.137 
As in the antebellum period, to the extent that Congress and the courts 
weighed in on constitutional, or constitutionally resonant, questions after the 
Civil War, it was generally to codify the work of administrators. Congress 
continued the practice of relying on administrators to draft statutes, including 
constitutionally sensitive questions such as the scope of agency jurisdiction, 
agency organization, and agency procedures.138 The Supreme Court also 
followed rather than led administrators’ answers to constitutional questions. As 
Anuj Desai has shown, when the Court in dicta weighed in on Fourth 
Amendment protection of letters in the 1878 case Ex Parte Jackson, it adopted a 
view of their privacy that had been developed by postal officials in the first 
instance. Desai explains that “the constitutional principle” voiced in Jackson “was 
simply the affirmation of long-standing law and custom in the post office.”139 
 
133 MASHAW, CREATING, supra note 7, at 259-60. 
134 Id. at 278 (“[N]otwithstanding the absence of judicial demands for administrative due 
process, the adjudicatory processes at . . . the Post Office paid significant attention to issues of 
adjudicatory fairness.”). 
135 Id. at 254. 
136 POSTELL, supra note 6, at 159. 
137 See Hayden, 27 Pub. Lands Dec. 455, 457-58 (1898) (remanding for hearing upon review of 
due process challenge); Guerten, 23 Pub. Lands Dec. 479, 479 (1896) (finding due process required 
granting motion for hearing to Guerten); No. Pac. R.R., supra note 31; Bone, 8 Pub. Lands Dec. 
452, 454-56 (1889) (finding lack of notice to someone who was party of interest under statute fell 
short of due process). 
138 MASHAW, CREATING, supra note 7, at 233, 242-43. 
139 Anuj C. Desai, Wiretapping Before the Wires: The Post Office and the Birth of Communications 
Privacy, 60 STAN. L. REV. 553, 557 (2007). 
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II. PROGRESSIVE ERA ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM,    
1900–1933  
Administration continued to multiply and develop greater independence 
from the political branches during the Progressive Era, further expanding 
opportunities for administrative constitutionalism. At the same time, while 
federal courts grew more watchful, judicial review was a weak constraint on 
agencies that pursued those opportunities. Indeed, in the newly salient area 
of civil liberties, the Constitution remained administered first and foremost. 
The factors that contributed to the expansion of federal administration 
during the Progressive Era are legion. As Morton Keller has noted, changes 
in labor, enterprise, production, technology, marketing, distribution, and 
consumption resulted “in a far more complex and variegated economic order 
than Americans had ever experienced before.”140 Everything from businesses’ 
ever-larger size to the massive rise in accidents resulting from technological 
innovation generated interest in government action.141 A cultural as much as 
an intellectual shift from a nineteenth-century ethos of individual liberty to 
an early-twentieth-century preference for protection from risk also fed the 
turn toward the state.142 The rise of nationally organized action groups 
committed to reform, from women’s groups to labor unions to professional 
organizations, increased pressure on the government to respond.143 Elites’ 
growing distaste for political corruption and partisan spoils, their fascination 
with German bureaucracy, and their formation of professions that promised 
technocratic expertise and political independence all fed a turn toward 
 
140 MORTON KELLER, REGULATING A NEW ECONOMY: PUBLIC POLICY AND ECONOMIC 
CHANGE IN AMERICA, 1900–1933, at 3 (1990). 
141 See generally ALFRED D. CHANDLER JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL 
REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS (1977); JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL 
REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED WORKINGMEN, DESTITUTE WIDOWS AND THE REMAKING OF 
AMERICAN LAW (2004). 
142 See generally JENNIFER KLEIN, FOR ALL THESE RIGHTS: BUSINESS, LABOR, AND THE 
SHAPING OF AMERICA’S PUBLIC-PRIVATE WELFARE STATE (2003); BARBARA YOUNG WELKE, 
RECASTING AMERICAN LIBERTY: GENDER, RACE, LAW, AND THE RAILROAD REVOLUTION, 
1865–1920 (2001); WITT, supra note 141, at 5. 
143 See generally JULIE GREENE, PURE AND SIMPLE POLITICS: THE AMERICAN 
FEDERATION OF LABOR AND POLITICAL ACTIVISM, 1881–1917 (1998); DANIEL T. RODGERS, 
ATLANTIC CROSSINGS: SOCIAL POLITICS IN A PROGRESSIVE AGE (1998); ELIZABETH 
SANDERS, ROOTS OF REFORM: FARMERS, WORKERS, AND THE AMERICAN STATE, 1877–1917 
(1999); THEDA SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS: THE POLITICAL ORIGINS 
OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES (1995); SKOWRONEK, supra note 91. For an example 
of this dynamic, see DANIEL P. CARPENTER, THE FORGING OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY: 
REPUTATIONS, NETWORKS, AND POLICY INNOVATION IN EXECUTIVE AGENCIES, 1862–1928, at 
257-70 (2001). National organizations existed in the nineteenth century but their prevalence and 
relevance increased after the turn of the century. 
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administered solutions to the days’ pressing problems.144 Meanwhile, world 
war, waves of immigration at a time when its policing was newly federalized, 
and the growth of the United States’ overseas empire put additional 
expansionist pressures on the federal government.145 
Not surprisingly, administration multiplied, morphed, and developed 
greater autonomy from parties and politicians.146 Congress created new 
agencies such as the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and a hodgepodge of 
public corporations including the U.S. Emergency Fleet Corporation and the 
Federal Land Banks.147 Existing departments gained new responsibilities as 
the Department of Agriculture began to regulate food and drugs and the 
Treasury Department implemented the newly constitutional federal income 
tax.148 World War I drove Congress to greatly expand the breadth of its 
delegations to agencies, brought administration to many sectors of the 
economy, and grew new capacities within the Department of Defense to 
handle everything from excusing conscientious objectors to managing 
munitions.149 After the war, Prohibition produced a massive increase in the 
federal government’s investigative and prosecutorial apparatus.150 
 
144 These are canonical features of the Progressives. On Americans’ turn to administration to 
liberate themselves from corrupt legislatures, see ERNST, supra note 98, at 141. On the professions’ 
role in expanding administration during this period, see CARPENTER, supra note 143; RODGERS, 
supra note 143; SKOWRONEK, supra note 91. For the influence of German intellectuals and 
bureaucratic traditions, see ERNST, supra note 98; RODGERS, supra note 143. For specific examples, 
see MEHROTRA, supra note 103; WITT, supra note 141. 
145 Recent works looking at how administrators responded to each of these pressures include 
MARGOT CANADAY, THE STRAIGHT STATE: SEXUALITY AND CITIZENSHIP IN TWENTIETH-
CENTURY AMERICA (2011); Erman, supra note 19; Kessler, supra note 19. 
146 This pattern of growth was far from uniform of course. Agencies had differing success at 
achieving independence. CARPENTER, supra note 143, at 9-10. And even as agencies and their powers 
proliferated in the early-twentieth century, they provoked profound anxieties about their legitimacy 
and resistance to their endeavors. ERNST, supra note 98. 
147 On federal experiments with public corporations, see GAIL RADFORD, THE RISE OF THE 
PUBLIC AUTHORITY: STATEBUILDING AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN TWENTIETH-
CENTURY AMERICA chs. 1, 2, 4 (2013). 
148 On the Pure Food and Drug Act, see CARPENTER, supra note 143, at 256-57. On the 
formation of the federal “fiscal state” during the Progressive Era, see MEHROTRA, supra note 103, 
at 15, 284. Daniel Carpenter notes that even as the number of independent agencies grew during 
this period, “the vast share of nonmilitary state activity, government employment, and public 
expenditure” occurred in executive departments. CARPENTER, supra note 143, at 9. 
149 On World War I’s impact on congressional delegations, see ERNST, supra note 98, at 44. 
For the administrative apparatus for conscientious objectors, see Kessler, supra note 19, at 1111. For 
statist management of the economy during the war, see DAVID M. KENNEDY, OVER HERE: THE 
FIRST WORLD WAR AND AMERICAN SOCIETY 94 (1980). See generally CHRISTOPHER 
CAPOZZOLA, UNCLE SAM WANTS YOU: WORLD WAR I AND THE MAKING OF THE MODERN 
CITIZEN (2008). 
150 For the argument that Prohibition was critical to building the modern American state, see LISA 
MCGIRR, THE WAR ON ALCOHOL: PROHIBITION AND THE RISE OF THE AMERICAN STATE (2016). 
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As administration expanded, so too did the opportunities for 
administrative constitutionalism. Reuel Schiller notes that adding the federal 
regulation of radio to that of the mails multiplied administrators’ power to 
censor speech.151 The Sixteenth Amendment required government lawyers to 
implement their understanding of the government’s constitutional authority 
to tax.152 The federal income tax also constituted a massive increase in the 
government’s ability to surveil and inspect businesses and the public, 
touching on Fourth Amendment concerns.153 The FTC’s investigations into 
business records likewise put the agency at the center of debates about the 
Fourth Amendment.154 At the War Department, administrators’ commitment 
to excusing secular conscientious objectors led them to construct the scope of 
the President’s Commander-in-Chief powers and forge new civil liberties.155 
Congress continued to follow rather than lead agencies’ implementation 
of the Constitution. As mentioned above, its signature actions in the areas of 
taxes, fair trade, and prohibition expanded government surveillance with 
little legislative guidance. Congress policed administration through high-
profile investigations, not detailed instructions regarding agency procedure 
or regulation of privacy and speech.156 Although Congress eventually debated 
the constitutionality of the War Department’s program for secular 
conscientious objectors, for instance, it was an inconclusive and largely post 
hoc affair.157 Meanwhile, bureaucrats at the Post Office and the Department 
of Agriculture outmaneuvered opponents in Congress to secure desired 
programs and powers, exercising what Daniel Carpenter termed a new form 
of “bureaucratic autonomy.”158 
Despite a series of strong presidencies, agencies continued to own their 
constitutionally salient policies. The century’s first three presidents had 
sufficient partisan strength in Congress, political independence, and 
administrative reform ambitions to usher in the modern administrative 
state.159 Their abilities to check administrative action were nonetheless 
limited. Even Theodore Roosevelt found himself outmaneuvered by agency 
 
151 Schiller, Free Speech and Expertise, supra note 85, at 45-46 (2000). 
152 MEHROTRA, supra note 103, at 297-98. 
153 Id. at 284. 
154 Ken I. Kersch, The Reconstruction of Constitutional Privacy Rights and the New American State, 
16 STUD. IN AM. POL. DEV., Spring 2002, at 61, 63. 
155 Kessler, supra note 19, at 1112-13, 1139-40, 1161. 
156 For a popular account of one of the era’s most famous congressional investigations, see 
generally LATON MCCARTNEY, THE TEAPOT DOME SCANDAL: HOW BIG OIL BOUGHT THE 
HARDING WHITE HOUSE AND TRIED TO STEAL THE COUNTRY (2008). 
157 See Kessler, supra note 19, at 1145-47. See generally 58 Cong. Rec. H3065-68 (July 23, 1919) 
(statement of Rep. Newton); 57 Cong. Rec. H3233-35 (Feb. 12, 1919) (statement of Rep. Chandler). 
158 CARPENTER, supra note 143, at 111-12; 257-70. 
159 SKOWRONEK, supra note 91, at 171-75. 
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heads, for instance when the Post Master General refused to use his powers 
against Roosevelt’s political opponents in 1905.160 His successor, William H. 
Taft, sought to impose a more narrow and judicialized Constitution on the 
administrative state. His reform agenda was gravely hampered, however, when 
he lost his Republican controlled Congress as well as the support of moderate 
Republicans midway through his term.161 Early in Woodrow Wilson’s 
administration, he allowed Congress to take the lead in controlling 
administration in exchange for getting his reforms through, a bargain he later 
found difficult to reverse.162 Even the presidential appointment power, a key 
method of control, was of limited effect during this period, at least for agencies 
that were able to develop sufficient political legitimacy and support.163 
Courts stepped up their review of administration, particularly regarding 
the constitutional limits on agency action. Judicial review generally expanded 
and grew more muscular during this period. Courts famously struck down a 
record number of laws on Commerce Clause and substantive due process 
grounds.164 Agencies did not escape courts’ more robust scrutiny. The 
Supreme Court in 1902 extended judicial authority to review agencies’ 
conclusions of law into a general principle of judicial review of agency 
action.165 Simultaneously, courts ate away at their once absolute deference to 
agencies’ factual findings, carving out new categories of “jurisdictional” and 
“constitutional” facts subject to de novo review.166 Their willingness to review 
agencies for procedural shortcomings also grew.167 
There were pronounced limits on this newly robust judicial oversight, 
however, leaving agencies striking discretion regarding the scope of 
constitutional protections. As Daniel Ernst observes, the Supreme Court 
(though not always federal judges) applied the constitutional and jurisdictional 
fact doctrines carefully, leaving abundant space for judicial deference to 
administrative decision making.168 In a range of constitutionally sensitive areas, 
 
160 CARPENTER, supra note 143, at 2. 
161 SKOWRONEK, supra note 91, at 173-74. 
162 Id. at 175. 
163 CARPENTER, supra note 143, at 361. 
164 This trend gave the “Lochner era” its name but note that the Court still upheld the vast 
majority of state and federal statutes it reviewed. See Keith E. Whittington, Congress Before the 
Lochner Court, 85 B.U. L. REV. 821, 830-31 (2005) (finding the Court upheld federal statutes in 85 
percent of cases between 1890 and 1919 and describing other scholar’s findings that the Court upheld 
state statutes in over 94 percent of cases). 
165 See MASHAW, CREATING, supra note 7, at 248-49, 274-75 (discussing Am. Sch. of Magnetic 
Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94 (1902)). 
166 ERNST, supra note 98, at 36. 
167 Id. at 38. For an example, see LUCY E. SALYER, LAWS HARSH AS TIGERS: CHINESE 
IMMIGRANTS AND THE SHAPING OF MODERN IMMIGRATION LAW 175-78 (1995), discussing Chin 
Yow v. United States, 208 U.S. 8 (1908). 
168 ERNST, supra note 98, at 29-30, 41-43. 
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judicial deference and vague doctrine left agencies a free hand. Sam Erman 
describes how the ambiguity of the Court’s decisions in the Insular Cases left 
federal officials “freedom . . . in charting federal policies for U.S. imperial 
acquisitions,” including the constitutional rights of their inhabitants.169 Reuel 
Schiller documents judicial deference to administrators’ decisions about 
permissible speech.170 In the sphere of immigration, Lucy Salyer argues that 
despite repeated efforts to expand courts’ oversight of agency procedures, 
“‘[j]udicial justice’ was not seen as particularly essential or relevant in the 
administrative realm.”171 Ken Kersch tells a similar story of Fourth Amendment 
protections, as the Supreme Court “began to repeatedly distance itself from the 
most sweeping readings of its . . . precedents and to negotiate a rapprochement 
with the perceived imperatives of the new American state.”172 
Indeed, by the 1920s, Stephen Skowronek describes the “institutional 
politics in American national government” as being “organized around 
administrative power and a stalemate of constitutional controls” by Congress, 
the courts, and the President.173 
III. ADMINISTERING THE CONSTITUTION SINCE THE NEW DEAL, 
1933–THE PRESENT  
The scale, scope, and nature of administration transformed during and 
after the New Deal. Meanwhile, Congress continued to charge agencies with 
constitutionally resonant responsibilities even as it struggled to develop 
effective tools for monitoring agencies’ exercise of those responsibilities. The 
President filled the breach by centralizing and expanding White House 
oversight of agencies but, as the executive branch expanded dramatically to 
meet that challenge, it also diluted and fractured its influence. The Supreme 
Court, for its part, drew ever more administrative action under its review 
while also asserting more aggressive supremacy regarding constitutional 
interpretation. At the same time, lawyers gained influence in agencies, 
bringing greater deference to the judiciary with them. As a result, although 
administrative constitutionalism persisted, it grew more deferential to the 
 
169 Erman, supra note 19, at 1230. 
170 Schiller, Free Speech and Expertise, supra note 85, at 21-22. 
171 SALYER, supra note 167, at 214. See generally id. at ch. 7; see also Kristin A. Collins, Bureaucracy 
as the Border: Administrative Law and the Citizen Family, 66 DUKE L.J. 1727, 1740 n.4 (2017) 
[hereinafter Collins, Bureaucracy as the Border] (discussing United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253, 260, 
261-63 (1905), which deemed agency determinations of citizenship status conclusive and not subject 
to judicial review for their comportment with due process). 
172 Kersch, supra note 154, at 78. 
173 SKOWRONEK, supra note 91, at 176; see also id. at 16 (“The new American state emerged with 
a powerful administrative arm, but authoritative controls over this power were locked in a 
constitutional stalemate.”). 
 
1734 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 167: 1699 
courts. This deference was accompanied by a diminution, rather than an 
increase, in judicial respect for administrative constitutionalism, however. 
The New Deal and World War II transformed administration and 
unsettled the roles of the Court, Congress, the President, and agencies in 
determining due process in agency hearings. The Great Depression and the 
exigencies of world war massively expanded the administrative state. As 
Joanna Grisinger describes, by the end of the 1930s, the work of agencies had 
“dwarfed the caseload of Congress and the federal courts” and “taken on the 
lion’s share of federal governance.”174 Further, as James Sparrow observes, 
“[t]he agencies that conducted the mobilization for the Second World War 
quickly dwarfed the New Deal programs . . . .”175 Worried that expansionist 
New Dealers had abandoned key checks on administration established by 
agencies over the past century, Chief Justice Charles Evan Hughes led the 
Supreme Court in more aggressively specifying core procedural 
requirements.176 The lawyers who had rushed into the New Deal government 
heeded the Court both in their drafting of new legislation and the procedures 
they designed and enforced within their agencies.177 Even corporate lawyers, 
generally seen as the enemies of administration, preferred the consistency of 
agencies to the uncertainty of special legislative bills and common law courts 
and thus backed Hughes’ proceduralist approach.178 
While the battles over agency procedure had largely subsided within the 
courts and the legal profession by World War II, the political storm 
persisted.179 In 1939, President Roosevelt tasked the Attorney General with 
forming a committee to investigate administrative procedures. He did so in 
large part to fend off legislative action by critics in Congress.180 The 
committee’s 1941 report set off years-long interbranch negotiations. In 1946, 
Congress codified in the Administrative Procedure Act a procedural 
compromise that looked more or less like that already reached among bench, 
bar, and agencies.181 Congress also streamlined its oversight of agencies 
 
174 JOANNA L. GRISINGER, THE UNWIELDY AMERICAN STATE: ADMINISTRATIVE 
POLITICS SINCE THE NEW DEAL 2 (2014). 
175 JAMES T. SPARROW, WARFARE STATE: WORLD WAR II AMERICANS AND THE AGE OF 
BIG GOVERNMENT 6 (2011); see also IRA KATZNELSON, FEAR ITSELF: THE NEW DEAL AND THE 
ORIGINS OF OUR TIME 18-20, chs. 11-12 (2013) [hereinafter KATZNELSON, FEAR ITSELF] (arguing 
that World War II transformed the American state by building a newly robust, centralized, and 
globally vigorous national security apparatus); Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Administrative War, 82 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1343, 1347 (2014) (arguing that World War II “led to a surge in the power and 
size of the federal administrative state”). 
176 Ernst, supra note 98, at 5, 51-71. 
177 Id. at 68, 71-76. See generally PETER H. IRONS, NEW DEAL LAWYERS (1982). 
178 ERNST, supra note 98, at 5-6, 142. 
179 GRISINGER, supra note 174, at 4-6, 16-17, 26-31. 
180 ERNST, supra note 98, at 132. 
181 Id. at 137. 
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through the Legislative Reorganization Act to counter Roosevelt’s earlier 
consolidation of executive control.182 In the early 1950s, the Supreme Court 
signaled that it would now defer to Congress and agencies on the scope of 
due process protections.183 
The battle over agency procedure followed a mostly familiar pattern of 
agencies’ constitutional experimentation ultimately leading to court and 
congressional codification, albeit with a more robust role for the Court and a newly 
systematic codification by Congress. But changes in judicial review, lawyering, legal 
theory, and attorneys’ roles in agencies that began at the same time fundamentally 
changed the dynamics of administrative constitutionalism going forward. 
In the wake of World War II, agencies’ reputations declined, leading to 
changes in their structure and practices. In part due to agencies’ ever-more 
elaborate procedures, their backlogs grew, along with complaints about their 
inefficiency.184 Critics also charged that agencies created during the 
Progressive and New Deal eras to equalize the public’s power with that of 
industry had instead become beholden to the businesses they regulated.185 
During the next major wave of regulatory legislation in the 1960s and 1970s, 
Congress responded to the growing distrust of federal agencies and concerns 
about agency ossification. It passed ambitious laws that blanketed the 
economy with new requirements touching on civil rights, workplace safety, 
and the environment. While these laws created some high profile new 
 
182 GRISINGER, supra note 174, at 10 (describing the act as giving members of Congress “the 
necessary tools for keeping an eye on the administrative state”). On Roosevelt’s earlier consolidation 
efforts, see Reorganization Act of 1939, Pub. L. 76-19, 53 Stat. 561 (1939); Franklin D. Roosevelt, 
Summary of the Report of the Committee on Administrative Management, January 12, 1937, THE 
AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT (last accessed July 29, 2019), https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu
/node/209074 [https://perma.cc/BAT2-CLC3]. 
183 See Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 45-47, 50-51 (1950) (finding it would raise due 
process concerns if deportation proceedings did not have to comport with the APA’s formal adjudication 
requirements and that those designed by the Immigration Service did not); McCarren-Walter Act, Pub. 
L. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163, sec. 242(b) (1952) (amending the Immigration and Nationality Act to specify 
the “sole and exclusive” procedures for deportation hearings, including ones that did not comply with 
the APA’s formal adjudication requirements in ways similar to those questioned in Wong Yang Sung); 
Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 308-09, 311 (1955) (finding McCarren-Walter Act procedures 
superseded APA and that its non-APA compliant procedures, upon which Wong Yang Sung had cast 
constitutional doubt, comported with procedural due process). On the persistence and desirability of 
judicial deference to agency due process determinations, see Vermeule, supra note 20. 
184 GRISINGER, supra note 174, at 12. See, e.g., Carleton Kent, Report Rips NLRB Apart on 
Inefficiency, Delay, Rift, CHI. SUN TIMES, May 22, 1959 (describing a “devastatingly critical report” 
by McKinsey Company on the National Labor Relations Board including that staff morale was at a 
nadir and it was facing huge backlogs in its cases). 
185 GRISINGER, supra note 174, at 228-29, 236-37, 251-52. Contemporaneous examples of the 
capture critique include GABRIEL KOLKO, RAILROADS AND REGULATION, 1877–1916 (1965); 
THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM (1969). 
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agencies,186 they also pushed administration in a more hidden direction, 
funneling work to local agencies,187 populating existing federal agencies with 
low salience offices,188 and shunting enforcement activity to ordinary 
Americans and the private bar.189 In part to respond to charges of inefficiency 
and bloat, agencies also outsourced work to private contractors and shifted 
toward regulating via rulemaking rather than adjudication.190 
Despite agencies’ declining reputations, their opportunities to interpret and 
implement the Constitution persisted, even flowered. During and after World 
War II, domestic and international pressure on the federal government to 
advance African Americans’ civil rights grew. Southern Democrats’ stranglehold 
on Congress diverted the response from the legislative to the executive 
branch.191 As the President and agencies sought ways to advance civil rights, the 
Constitution provided the authority to act that Congress refused.192 Meanwhile, 
administrators used novel constitutional interpretations to standardize and 
strengthen federal control over state and local agencies’ administration of New 
Deal welfare programs.193 This strategy provided a template for agencies 
 
186 Examples included the Environmental Protection Agency and the Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration. 
187 Great Society Programs, for instance, bypassed states to funnel funding to local agencies 
and organizations. On how this strategy helped avoid conflicts with Congress and other federal 
agencies, see Richard M. Flanagan, Lyndon Johnson, Community Action, and Management of the 
Administrative State, 31 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 585 (2001). On how it transformed local 
communities, see THE WAR ON POVERTY: A NEW GRASSROOTS HISTORY, 1964–1980 (Annelise 
Orleck and Lisa Hazirjian eds., 2011). 
188 For instance, civil rights offices proliferated within existing federal agencies. See generally 
HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA: ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL 
POLICY, 1960–1972 (1990). 
189 See generally SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND 
PRIVATE LAWSUITS IN THE U.S. (2010). 
190 See generally JON D. MICHAELS, CONSTITUTIONAL COUP: PRIVATIZATION’S THREAT TO 
THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC (2017); Reuel E. Schiller, Rulemaking’s Promise: Administrative Law and 
Legal Culture in the 1960s and 1970s, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 1139 (2001). 
191 See MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF 
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 82-83 (2002) (“On civil rights, [President Truman’s] prospects were 
particularly bleak because of the hold of Southern Democrats on key Senate committee 
chairmanships. Truman had greater latitude to act on civil rights when he could act alone.”); IRA 
KATZNELSON, WHEN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION WAS WHITE: AN UNTOLD HISTORY OF RACIAL 
INEQUALITY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA x, xv (2005) (documenting how Southern 
Democrats ensured that the social policies of the 1930s and 40s excluded African Americans from 
their benefits). 
192 LEE, WORKPLACE, supra note 16, at chs. 2, 5, 7. Administrators’ response was not uniform. 
For an example of an agency that interpreted its constitutional duties to advance civil rights 
unusually narrowly, see Milligan, supra note 20. See also Alina Das, Administrative Constitutionalism 
in Immigration Law, 98 B.U. L. REV. 485, 506 (2018) (documenting the Bureau of Immigration 
Appeals’ inconsistent engagement with parties’ constitutional arguments). 
193 See generally TANI, STATES OF DEPENDENCY, supra note 19; Tani, Administrative Equal 
Protection, supra note 19; Karen M. Tani, Welfare and Rights Before the Movement: Rights as a Language 
of the State, 122 YALE L.J. 314 (2012). 
 
2019] Our Administered Constitution 1737 
charged with implementing civil rights restrictions on federal funding enacted 
by Congress in the 1960s and 1970s.194 Administrators also contended that 
constitutional constraints attached to federal dollars generally and even to 
beneficiaries of tax policy.195 Agencies’ shift to rulemaking provided another 
avenue for administrative constitutionalism, as agencies from the 1960s to the 
present day used notice-and-comment proceedings to formulate constitutionally 
informed policies and debate constitutional questions.196 
Presidential and congressional efforts to ramp up oversight of agencies 
struggled to keep pace with the growing scope and complexity of 
administrative action, limiting their ability to direct agencies’ constitutional 
policies. Joanna Grisinger argues that Congress’s revised committee 
structure’s “promises of improved oversight proved more significant than the 
actual results.”197 In the 1980s, the Supreme Court struck down the legislative 
 
194 See, e.g., Revised Statement of Policies for School Desegregation Plans Under Title VI of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 45 C.F.R. § 181.54 (1967), reprinted in U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, 
FEDERAL RIGHTS UNDER SCHOOL DESEGREGATION LAW 11-21 (1966) (providing guidance for 
when school choice plans would be found to meet constitutional requirements); GARY ORFIELD, THE 
RECONSTRUCTION OF SOUTHERN EDUCATION 101 (1969) (describing the drafting of the 
guidelines, noting that while they ended up hewing more closely to court interpretations of the 
Constitution than some drafters preferred, they enabled the administration “to desegregate, in four 
months time, far more districts than the [f]ederal courts had reached in 10 years”). For earlier debates 
about the constitutional limits on federal funding, see Milligan, supra note 20, at 24-32, describing 
disputes between Departments of Education and Defense as to whether equal protection or federalism 
principles governed federally funded schools on military bases in the 1950s and documenting the 
Department of Education lawyers’ view that their Department had to stop funding segregated 
educational programs after the Supreme Court declared public school segregation unconstitutional 
because failing to do so would involve “the use of Federal monies for an unconstitutional purpose” 
(internal quotations omitted); Tani, Administrative Equal Protection, supra note 19, at 880, recounting 
pre-Title VI agency officials worried that attaching constitutional constraints to federal funding was 
ill-advised because it could lead to massive defunding of state welfare programs. See also LEE, 
WORKPLACE, supra note 16, at 107 (describing how President Eisenhower and Vice President Nixon 
assumed the federal government had heightened obligations to ensure equal employment on federally 
funded work). 
195 See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 586-95 (1983) (allowing the IRS to take 
equal protection values into consideration in meeting its statutory duty); Comments on the Justice 
Department Preliminary Memorandum Regarding Expansion of the Definition of Government 
Contract in the Proposed OFCC Regulations at 1, undated memo [circa 1967], folder 103, box 1, 
Records of John Doar, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, 1960–1967, Department 
of Justice, RG 60 (National Archives, Washington, D.C.) (arguing that the President has a 
constitutional “obligation to ensure that assistance the Government extends is not being used to 
subsidize discriminatory employment practices”); Lee, Race, Sex, and Rulemaking, supra note 16, at 
832, 851 (quoting government officials who argued that federal agencies had a constitutional 
obligation to ensure contractees and grantees did not discriminate in employment). 
196 See Jeffrey A. Gibbs, Paul L. Ferrari & Anne Marie Murphy, Ripe for Revision: Reassessing 
the Constitutionality of Food and Drug Administration Restrictions on Protected Speech, 58 FOOD & DRUG 
L.J. 331, 331 (2003) (discussing a notice-and-comment process initiated by the Food and Drug 
Administration that “solicited comments from the public on a broad range of First Amendment 
issues”); Lee, Race, Sex, and Rulemaking, supra note 16. 
197 GRISINGER, supra note 174, at 11. 
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veto, a key oversight tool Congress had developed to review and invalidate 
agency actions using procedures short of full-blown bicameralism and 
presentment.198 By most measures, the President was more successful at 
centralizing and expanding oversight of agency action.199 This was 
accomplished through a range of strategies, including the growth of the White 
House executive office and use of executive orders imposing cost–benefit and 
other analyses on agencies.200 Yet, the very growth of the oversight apparatus 
diffused its impact. Indeed, a 2006 study found that, although agencies heard 
policy directives regularly from the White House, those directives came from 
different sources and often pointed in competing directions.201 As a result, 
agencies retained freedom from Congress and the President when 
interpreting the Constitution.202 
Continuing limits on judicial review also left ample space for 
administrative constitutionalism to thrive.203 The Warren and Burger Courts 
expanded avenues for courts to impose their constitutional interpretations on 
agencies through the recognition of constitutional torts,204 expansion of 
standing and justiciability doctrines,205 and erosion of presumptions against 
the reviewability of agency action.206 By the mid-1970s, however, the tide had 
 
198 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). But see Louis Fisher, The Legislative Veto: Invalidated, 
It Survives, 56 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 273 (1993) (documenting that even after Chadha, committee 
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Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV 2245 (2001). For their origins in the FDR administration, see 
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Management and Budget, particularly its Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, are 
especially salient loci for presidential oversight of federal agencies. 
201 Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative State: A Critical 
Look at the Practice of Presidential Control, 105 MICH. L. REV. 47 (2006). 
202 Historical examples exist of Congress considering constitutionally informed agency 
policies and either codifying them or refusing to reject them. See Lee, Race, Sex, and Rulemaking, 
supra note 16, at 853-54, 878 n.359 (“As 1971 turned to 1972, equal employment rulemaking continued 
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203 See Reuel E. Schiller, The Era of Deference: Courts, Expertise, and the Emergence of New Deal 
Administrative Law, 106 MICH. L. REV. 399, 434 (2007) (describing the wide berth federal courts 
gave administrative agencies in the wake of the New Deal); see also Metzger, 1930s Redux, supra note 
6, at 61 (explaining that mid-twentieth-century judicial review of agency action focused primarily 
on its compliance with statutes not the Constitution). 
204 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 396 (1971) (recognizing tort claim for 
violation of the Fourth Amendment). 
205 See, e.g., NAACP v. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 459 (1958) (allowing third-party standing); 
Elizabeth Magill, Standing for the Public: A Lost History, 95 VA. L. REV. 1131, 1133 (2009) (“[T]he 
Supreme Court acknowledged that these parties had no legally cognizable injury—no legal rights—but 
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206 See Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140-141 (1967) (finding a presumption in favor of 
reviewability of agency action absent congressional indication otherwise); Gardner v. Toilet Goods 
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turned and the Court used these same levers to steadily constrict judicial 
review.207 At the same time, government grew in the last decades of the 
twentieth century, particularly in areas such as national security, immigration 
enforcement, and criminal justice, toward the administrators of which the 
Court showed particular deference.208 Even where judicial review was 
available, the Court’s own doctrines sometimes left administration of the 
First,209 Fourth,210 Fifth,211 and Sixth Amendments largely to agencies’ 
discretion.212 Further, the scope of agency action and the limits on federal 
courts ensured that judicial review left much agency action untouched.213 
Changes in lawyering also fed agencies’ administrative constitutionalism. 
Beginning in the 1940s, civil rights advocates shifted their attention to federal 
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Fourth Amendment right to freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures, and lack of external 
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agencies, arguing that the Constitution required them to adopt specific 
policies.214 Over the next decades they forced constitutional questions onto 
an expanding array of regulators.215 By the 1960s and 1970s, a burgeoning 
corps of legal services lawyers bent on securing equal treatment, due process, 
and privacy protections for recipients of government benefits joined them in 
imposing constitutional duties on government agencies.216 At the same time, 
a cadre of lawyers who fought for equal protection for women and minorities 
within the administrations of Presidents Kennedy and Johnson exited 
government. Once outside, they sought ways to ensure that the Republican-
led agencies of the 1970s and 1980s continued their work.217 During these 
years, conservative lawyers opposed to the modern regulatory state also 
organized. They formed legal advocacy groups that launched constitutional 
attacks on agencies.218 The Reagan administration also created new 
opportunities for conservative lawyers in government, where they advanced 
their deregulatory constitutional views.219 Together, these lawyers, 
participating in what became known as the public interest bar, created new 
avenues for disseminating constitutional arguments within, and pressing for 
the adoption of constitutionally informed policies, by federal agencies. 
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Yet, even as administrative constitutionalism persisted, it became far more 
judicialized. In part, this is due to the Court expanding vastly its review of 
constitutional questions. In the 1930s, even as the Court stepped back from 
its Lochner-era substantive due process jurisprudence, it began carving out for 
special protection preferred constitutional rights and politically powerless 
victims.220 Simultaneously, anti-regulatory conservatives turned to litigating 
First Amendment claims in particular and civil liberties generally in the 
hopes of building a judicially administered constitutional bulwark against the 
growing regulatory state.221 They were joined by civil rights and civil liberties 
advocates seeking protections for disfavored groups such as labor organizers, 
religious minorities, and African Americans.222 Those efforts met with 
considerable success. Starting with the First Amendment and spreading over 
subsequent decades out to the Fourteenth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourth 
Amendments, the Supreme Court steadily expanded the scope of 
constitutional provisions it found the government had violated.223 The Court 
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also increased the frequency with which it was prepared to so rule and 
asserted more boldly that its word was the final—and possibly exclusive—
answer to such questions.224 Whereas its Lochner-era substantive due process 
decisions had focused on challenges to the laws Congress enacted, the Court’s 
mid-century rights revolution targeted the way laws were administered. As a 
result, those decisions steadily infused an ever-denser body of constitutional 
doctrine into administrative actions and imposed new constitutional 
constraints on administration.225 
The legal academy fed the judicialization of administrative 
constitutionalism. Legal process theory, which dominated jurisprudential 
thought in the mid-twentieth century, favored judicial, rather than 
administrative, resolution of constitutional questions. Its expounders 
bolstered deference to political branches and agencies in some contexts, but 
also elevated implementation of the Constitution’s rights-bearing provisions 
as a quintessentially, perhaps distinctly, judicial undertaking. In defending the 
role of courts in a democratic system, they emphasized courts’ particular 
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Fifth Amendment requires an evidentiary hearing before a recipient of government benefits can be 
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institutional competencies. Those involved the capacity for (and duty to 
engage in) neutral and abstract principled reasoning, exactly the opposite of 
the grounded, localized interpretations agencies were known for. While 
process theorists were sensitive to judges’ inability to resolve political 
questions, they helped justify the Court’s more robust rights-based 
constitutionalism. They also defended the supremacy of the courts’ 
interpretations where they did weigh in on constitutional questions.226 
The Court’s rights revolution judicialized administrative constitutionalism 
in less direct ways as well. Part of the New Deal settlement turned on securing 
the role of lawyers within agencies to ensure their compliance with due process 
and other legal values.227 Lawyers, trained in the Langdellian tradition, 
brought with them a focus on judicial precedent.228 They were inclined to 
serve their role of regulating the regulators by reasoning from case law. And 
whereas before they might have had no choice but to reason from custom and 
constitutional first principles, the Court’s growing constitutional rights 
jurisprudence ensured that they had ample judicial sources to which to turn.229 
Agencies’ increasingly court-centric legal culture was not the only factor 
leading them to rely on judicial precedent to answer constitutional questions. 
The Court’s rights activism and assertions of judicial supremacy gave 
administrators incentives to punt difficult constitutional question to courts.230 
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constitutional questions outside their authority to consider, see Das, supra note 192, at 506-14, 533-35. 
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In constitutional disputes within agencies, administrators strategically invoked 
judicial supremacy and precedent to advance their arguments.231 
The result has been that, since the New Deal, opportunities for 
administrative constitutionalism have proliferated, but its practice has become 
more legalistic and more deferential to judicial doctrine. At the same time, 
while congressional and presidential oversight of the phenomenon remains 
relatively weak, courts have expanded their constitutional review of agencies 
and heightened their skepticism toward administrative constitutionalism. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court to this day remains deeply ambivalent about administrative 
constitutionalism. As described above, the Court has vastly expanded its 
ambit to review, and provide the final word on, the constitutionality of agency 
action. Yet its decisions still contemplate some areas where agencies can 
interpret the Constitution free from court review. For instance, at least in 
theory, the Court allows Congress to foreclose judicial review of 
constitutional claims against agencies if it does so with sufficient clarity.232 
The Court also continues to declare constitutional challenges to some types 
of executive branch actions outside its authority to review.233 And even as the 
Court has broadened its review of and strengthened its supremacy over the 
constitutional questions administration raises, it has not asserted exclusivity. 
Instead, the Court has preserved space for agencies to engage the 
Constitution. The Court, for example, has held that Congress can require 
constitutional claims to be heard in the first instance by an agency.234 Further, 
while the Court has stated that “adjudication of the constitutionality of 
congressional enactments has generally been thought beyond the jurisdiction 
of administrative agencies[,]” it has declined to so rule.235 The Court has also 
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refused to subject agencies’ constitutional interpretations to heightened 
scrutiny under the Administrative Procedure Act,236 even if it has also denied 
deference to agency statutory interpretations that raise serious constitutional 
questions.237 When the Court finds itself unable to address constitutional 
concerns itself by the bounds of its competence or its place in the 
constitutional structure, Justices have even encouraged agencies to fill these 
gaps with their own view of their constitutional responsibilities.238 
To this day, administrators also enforce the Constitution in ways that 
diverge from the courts.239 More modestly, they find ways to “conform[] to 
the letter of current equal protection doctrine, but tangle[] with its spirit.”240 
Further, agencies that do so “regulate us in many meaningful, and sometimes 
frightening, ways that either evade judicial review entirely or are at least 
substantially insulated from such review.”241 
The conservative Justices’ growing skepticism about the constitutionality 
of judicial deference to agency interpretations of statutes and their turn to 
greater judicial “engagement” does not bode well for the future of 
administrative constitutionalism.242 Neither do efforts to deeply constrain 
agencies’ ambit and subject them to far closer judicial scrutiny in the 
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Constitution’s name.243 Yet, the history sketched above suggests that the tools 
judges, lawyers, and scholars are fashioning to enhance judicial oversight of 
administration are ill-suited to more conclusively stamping out agency 
discretion to interpret and implement the Constitution. 
Granted, the account above raises as many questions as it answers. 
Scholars have just begun uncovering the history of administrative 
constitutionalism. Based on what is known thus far, it seems that for much of 
the United States’ history, agencies had a relatively free hand in 
implementing constitutionally sensitive policies, resolving structural 
constitutional questions, and determining what the Constitution’s rights-
bearing provisions meant in practice. Much less is known about how agencies 
made use of that discretion, however. For instance, apart from a few scattered 
case studies, there is very little known about the degree to which agencies 
during the nineteenth century explicitly considered and decided 
constitutional questions or merely determined the de facto lived meaning of 
the Constitution through the policies they adopted. In addition, it seems 
likely that the general lack of meaningful oversight from the political 
branches described above extended to oversight of agencies’ constitutional 
determinations, a likelihood that is confirmed in the few case studies that 
capture the dynamic. But there has not been any sustained study of the 
question. Also, the shift to more judicialized forms of administrative 
constitutionalism in the latter half of the twentieth century may be more 
apparent than real. This is the period for which there is the most sustained 
study of agencies’ actual constitutional practices. As a result, without looking 
more at those practices in earlier periods, it is not possible to say anything 
conclusive about the novelty or increased frequency of agencies’ deference to 
judge-made constitutional law after the New Deal. 
But even if further study reveals the account of administrative 
constitutionalism that is least disruptive to current critiques of the 
administrative state, that history would still disrupt plenty. Perhaps agencies 
did not frequently consider constitutional questions in the nineteenth century 
and, once the Court began offering its own answers in the twentieth century, 
mainly deferred to them. That would still leave us with the near total absence 
of courts’ constitutional review of agency action during the nineteenth century. 
Indeed, if the picture sketched above is accurate even in this one 
particular, it should alter the terrain of current debates about the 
constitutionality of the modern administrative state writ large. There may be 
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good reasons for courts to more closely scrutinize and conclusively determine 
the constitutionality of agency action. But those reasons will have to be 
grounded in changed circumstances or independent normative and 
theoretical principles. Reinstating the nineteenth-century constitutional 
order will if anything take us further from that goal.244 
Yet if critics of the administrative state do adopt more functionalist (rather 
than originalist or traditionalist) arguments to distribute authority between 
courts and agencies to interpret the Constitution, a new challenge will arise: 
how to explain why the past should be our guide for all other matters? 
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